On the demystification of mental imagery

Abstract

What might a theory of mental imagery look like, and how might one begin formulating such a theory? These are the central questions addressed in the present paper. The first section outlines the general research direction taken here and provides an overview of the empirical foundations of our theory of image representation and processing. Four issues are considered in succession, and the relevant results of experiments are presented and discussed. The second section begins with a discussion of the proper form for a cognitive theory, and the distinction between a theory and a model is developed. Following this, the present theory and computer simulation model are introduced. This theory specifies the nature of the internal representations (data structures) and the processes that operate on them when one generates, inspects, or transforms mental images. In the third, concluding, section we consider three very different kinds of objections to the present research program, one hinging on the possibility of experimental artifacts in the data, and the others turning on metatheoretical commitments about the form of a cognitive theory. Finally, we discuss how one ought best to evaluate theories and models of the sort developed here.

Mental extrapolation in patterns constructed from memory

“…. Since our control subjects were able to predict the h~ear nature of the RT functions, these findings agree With those of earlier studies, such as that of Mitchell and Richman (1980), in which subjects were told the independent and dependent variables of a typical imageryscanning experiment and were asked to guess their relationship (note that when independent and dependent variables are not pointed out, as in real scanning experiments, subjects are unlikely to guess the purpose of the experiment; Kosslyn et al, 1979). In any case, the absence of an increase in predicted RT at the G-em distance ar~ues that, in this experimental task, subjects do not, in general, respond according to their performance expectations (see Reed et al, 1983, for another demonstration of subjects' being unable to predict chronometric patterns in image scanning).…”

Interocular transfer of orientation-contingent color aftereffects with external and internal adaptation

“…The analogical view of imagery assumes that visual images uniquely depict or represent physical-spatial information in a format similar to that contained in vision (Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, & Schwartz, 1979;Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977). The analogical model also assumes that the processes that operate on visual images are the same processes that operate in the visual perception of actual objects.…”

Mental images can be ambiguous: Reconstruals and reference-frame reversals

“…In addition, we show that images constructed from good parts are more likely to reverse than images constructed from poor parts. On the basis of these results, we propose a functional organization of shape memory that is consistent with shape recognition findings as well as with our reversal findings.Given that imagery theories address questions regarding the nature of the imagined representation, theories of shape recognition are implicit in theories of imagery (see Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, & Shwartz, 1979). Indeed, because imagined shapes must be generated by memory structures, studies of the attributes of mental images (henceforth also just "images") may yield informationabout thecharacteristics of memory representations of shape.…”

“…Given that imagery theories address questions regarding the nature of the imagined representation, theories of shape recognition are implicit in theories of imagery (see Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, & Shwartz, 1979). Indeed, because imagined shapes must be generated by memory structures, studies of the attributes of mental images (henceforth also just "images") may yield informationabout thecharacteristics of memory representations of shape.…”