Mental images can be ambiguous: Reconstruals and reference-frame reversals

Abstract

like the duck/rabbit and the snail/elephant are reversible. We distinguish between two types of reversal: those that entail a change in reference-frame specification as well as a reconstrual of image components (reference-frame realignments) and those that entail reconstruals only (reconstruals). We show that reference-frame realignments can occur in imagery, particularly ifobservers are given an explicit or an implicit suggestion; and that reconstruals of images occur commonly, regardless of experimental conditions. In addition, we show that images constructed from good parts are more likely to reverse than images constructed from poor parts. On the basis of these results, we propose a functional organization of shape memory that is consistent with shape recognition findings as well as with our reversal findings.Given that imagery theories address questions regarding the nature of the imagined representation, theories of shape recognition are implicit in theories of imagery (see Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, & Shwartz, 1979). Indeed, because imagined shapes must be generated by memory structures, studies of the attributes of mental images (henceforth also just "images") may yield informationabout thecharacteristics of memory representations of shape. This issue underlies the current debate about whether mental images can be ambiguous-that is, whether such images can be reversed, reconstrued, or reinterpreted,just as picturescanbe.Some philosophers (e.g., Casey, 1976;Fodor, 1981) and psychologists (e.g., Kolers, 1983) have argued that mental images cannot be ambiguous, but empirical data have been lacking until recently. Chambers and Reisberg (l985) found that not 1 of 35 observers who originally saw only one of the two potential interpretations of the duck/rabbit ambiguous figure (Jastrow, 1900) could find the alternative interpretation in their memory image of the figure. Hence, they concluded that mental images of ambiguous pictures refer unambiguouslyto only one potential interpretation of the picture. Further, they argued that in the process of creating images, observers access shape representations by means of semantic representations, and that the two cannot be decoupled: Having seen a rabbit in a picture, one subsequently accesses a mental image of a rabbit that cannot be transformed into an image of a duck. According to this view, those of us who are familiar with the duck/rabbit figure, and might suppose that we are able to imagine a reversal, are simply replacing one image with another, rather than discovering an alternative interpretation of a single mental image.Although Chambers and Reisberg's (1985) findings were quite striking, Finke, Pinker, and Farah {l989} demonstrated that semantic and structural representations of objects can be separated. When asked to manipulate and combine alphanumeric characters or simple geometric shapes in imagery, their observers discovered a number of new shapes in the resultant configurations: for example, a particular arrangement of the letters J and D was interpreted as...

EEG dynamics reflects the partial and holistic effects in mental imagery generation

“…Furthermore, this retrieval induced stronger theta power to complete the detail of mental imagery, for it may encounter a more complex processing to retrieve information from memory. The results support the hypothesis that mental imagery also preserves partial features, and partial imagery could be retrieved directly from memory (Peterson et al, 1992). The alpha rhythm will be reduced during tasks requiring attention and mental effort.…”

“…However, what is of most relevance to mental imagery is retrieving the partial information from memory and defining the relationship between partial and holistic properties. Some study results have suggested that holistic properties might be retrieved before partial properties, but other study results have suggested that mental imagery also preserves partial features, which can be retrieved directly from memory (Peterson et al, 1992). Furthermore, most of the research results mentioned above were only based on behavioral methods.…”

Mental and perceptual feedback in the development of creative flow

“…Studies have since provided evidence that there is spatial and temporal equivalence between mental and perceptual imagery (Finke, 1980), that restructuring and reconstrual does frequently occur, and that geometric data are preserved in MI to allow new categorical interpretations to be formed (Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989;Mast & Kosslyn, 2002;Peterson, Kihlstrom, Rose, & Glisky, 1992). Wiseman, Watt, Georgiou, and Gilhooly (2011) showed that creative ability was linked to the ability to reinterpret ambiguous mental images mentally, confirming that agility in internally manipulating imagery is a fundamental component of creativity.…”

Mental image reversal and verbal recoding: When ducks become rabbits

“…They distinguish between reversals that entail assigning a new interpretation to the image components only (reconstruals) and reversals that imply a change in the specification of orientation (top/bottom, back/front of the image) as understood by the subject (reference-frame realignments). Reconstruals were shown to occur more readily in imagery than reversals entailing reference-frame realignments (Peterson et al, 1992). Reversals of the figures used by Finke et al (1989) and by Brandimonte et al (l992a, 1992bBrandimonte et al (l992a, , 1992c can be regarded as predominantly reconstruals, given that either instructions made clear the kind of reference frame to employ for reinterpretation or no change in the specification of the top/bottom or front/back was necessary in order to reinterpret the image (Brandimonte et al, 1992a(Brandimonte et al, , 1992b(Brandimonte et al, , 1992c.…”