On-Net/Off-Net Price Discrimination and 'Bill-and-Keep' vs. 'Cost-Based' Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates

Harbord, David; Pagnozzi, Marco

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1374851

Cited by 14 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 56 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Notwithstanding the clear relevance of the problem, these questions have received little attention in the economic literature. Most studies on network competition and interconnection (see the surveys by Armstrong, 2002;Vogelsang, 2003;Harbord and Pagnozzi, 2010) focus on the degree of market competition and the incentives to collude in setting (two-way) access charges in order to relax competition. The role of integration is still unexplored, and our paper aims to …ll this gap.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fixed-mobile integration

Hoernig

Cambini

2013

J Regul Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Often, …xed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the e¤ect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while …xed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more e¢ -cient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform o¤-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and even allows to maintain some of the e¢ ciency gains.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fixed-mobile integration

Hoernig

Cambini

2013

J Regul Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Tariff-mediated network effects versus strategic discounting: Evidence from German mobile telecommunications

Zucchini¹,

Claussen

Trüg³

2013

International Journal of Industrial Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Mobile telecommunication operators routinely charge subscribers lower prices for calls on their own network than for calls to other networks (on-net discounts). Studies on tariffmediated network effects suggest this is due to large operators using on-net discounts to damage smaller rivals. Alternatively, research on strategic discounting suggests small operators use on-net discounts to advertise with low on-net prices. We test the relative strength of these effects using data on tariff setting in German mobile telecommunications between 2001 and 2009. We find that large operators are more likely to offer tariffs with onnet discounts but there is no consistently significant difference in the magnitude of discounts.Our results suggest that tariff-mediated network effects are the main cause of on-net discounts.

show abstract

Roaming and investments in the mobile internet market

Stühmeier

2012

Telecommunications Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Terms of use: Documents in Roaming and Investments in the Mobile Internet MarketTorben Stühmeier * Universität Düsseldorf Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) March 27, 2012Abstract This model discusses mobile network operators' (MNOs) incentives to invest in their network facilities such as new 4G networks under various regimes of data roaming charge regulation. Given an induced externality of investments (spillovers) due to the roaming agreements it will be shown that MNOs, competing on investments, widely set higher investments for below cost regulation of roaming charges. Otherwise, if MNOs are free to collaborate on investments, they set higher investment levels for above cost roaming charges. Both below-and above cost charges may be preferred from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, the paper discusses effects of the roaming charge regulation on roaming quality and MNOs' coverage.

show abstract

On-Net/Off-Net Price Discrimination and 'Bill-and-Keep' vs. 'Cost-Based' Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates

Cited by 14 publications

References 56 publications

Fixed-mobile integration

Fixed-mobile integration

Tariff-mediated network effects versus strategic discounting: Evidence from German mobile telecommunications

Roaming and investments in the mobile internet market

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About