Motivated by the new auction format introduced in the England and Wales electricity market, as well as the recent debate in California, we characterize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. We find that uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duration of bids and the elasticity of demand are also analysed. We also consider the relationship between market structure and market performance in the two auction formats. Finally, we clarify some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular, we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as firms are restricted to a finite number of bids. JEL Classification Numbers: D44, L94, L10, L5

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This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between mobile networks in the presence of call externalities and network effects. It argues that the regulation of mobile termination rates based on fully allocated costs, or "long-run incremental cost plus," exacerbates the network effects associated with "tariff-mediated network externalities," by increasing mobile networks' on-net/off-net price differentials. This reduces welfare and acts as a barrier to growth for smaller networks and new entrants. The paper argues for the adoption of "bill-and-keep" for mobile termination rates, and responds to recent theoretical arguments which suggest that such a move might harm mobile subscribers.