Contracts and Competition in the Pay-TV Market

Content (non-)exclusivity in platform businesses the case of mobile broadcasting platforms

“…Since exclusivity in information markets operates on an even grander scale with network effects than with conventional economies, demand-scale economies allow incumbent companies to exclude other platforms to deny rivals critical mass to profitably enter markets [25]. A downstream company that holds the exclusive rights to high-quality content in the upstream market may obtain a competitive advantage over its competitors, which suffer from negative externalities [26]. When network externalities are there, the demand for a product or service depends not only on its price but also on the expected number of other users.…”

Triple play: How do we secure future benefits?

“…At this moment, sport organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels sometimes grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to broadcast their matches, movies and media content (see Stennek (2007) for examples from the US and Sweden, and Harbord and Ottaviani (2001), for examples from Great Britain). A dominant network owner may thus use its present position (large costumer base) to try to arrange for exclusive contracts with service providers thereby foreclosing access to this content via other distribution channels and creating indirect network externalities.…”

The transition to digital television

“…While the old focus of competition policy was the access of programmes to the dominant network (controlling competing programmes), the new 9 See Waterman and Weiss (1997) and Crawford (2000) for analyses of the US experience in the regulation of vertically integrated cable companies. See Armstrong (1999) and Harbord and Ottaviani (2001) for overviews of content provision in the UK pay television market. See Crawford (2000) and Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) on competition across platforms in the US.…”