Fixed-mobile integration

Hoernig, Steffen; Cambini, Carlo

doi:10.1007/s11149-013-9230-y

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 18 publications

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“…Assuming a fixed network monopoly, HOERNIG, BOURREAU and CAMBINI (2013) show that FMI leads to more efficient internal FTM prices, while external FTM prices are distorted upwards, amplifying the incumbency advantage of the integrated operator. These properties extend to the case of more than one fixed operator, suggesting that all fixed (mobile) operators should want to be associated with a mobile (fixed) operator.…”

Section: Geographic Differentiation Of Wholesale Access Regulationmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey

Vogelsang

2013

Review of Economics

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Telecommunications policy has come a long way from regulation of vertically integrated monopolies to the current state of competition. As competition becomes selfsustainable, will telecommunications policy in the form of industry-specific regulation go away or, if not, what form will it take? The economics literature suggests that the regulatory efficiency frontier is shifted by new technological and market developments, such as convergence of networks, fixed-mobile substitution (and integration) and next generation access networks. The frontier is also affected by the existing capital stock and other physical and institutional characteristics of a country. The insights from a review of the theoretical and empirical literature are applied to five policy areas. They are: (1) termination monopoly; (2) local bottleneck access; (3) net neutrality; (4) spectrum management; and (5) universal service. While in some of them, deregulation and a move to competition policy will soon be the efficient state of the art, regulation will remain efficient in others for some time. Deregulation will likely become efficient for one-way access and universal service, with the exception of some universal service policies in remote areas and for the poor. Termination will move to bill and keep with a duty to interconnect. In addition, some (more symmetric) regulation should persist for net neutrality in the form of transparency requirements, (quasi-) common carrier obligations and minimum quality standards. Also, spectrum management, while moving towards full-blown ownership rights, will continue to see regulators providing zoning and other services, particularly for unlicensed spectrum. All these assessments are premised on the success of making additional spectrum as the key resource available. They are also premised on the absence of a killer technology like P2P FTTH that potentially dominates all other technologies. What determines the endgame in telecommunications regulation? Although technical and market developments will dominantly shape the regulatory efficiency frontier, institutional and political economy factors have an additional and mostly slowing effect on policy changes. (JEL: L43; L86; L96; L98.

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Section: Geographic Differentiation Of Wholesale Access Regulationmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey

Vogelsang

2013

Review of Economics

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Fixed-mobile substitution and termination rates

Hoernig

Cambini²

2015

Telecommunications Policy

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This paper studies the e¤ect of termination rates on substitution between …xed and mobile calls and access, in a model where heterogeneous consumers can subscribe to one or both types of o¤ers. Simulations show that each (…xed or mobile) termination rate has a positive e¤ect on the take-up of the corresponding service, via the waterbed e¤ect, and lowers subscriptions to the other service, via a cost effect. The prevailing asymmetric regulation, with very low …xed and higher mobile termination rates, corresponds to the social optimum. However, the interests of the mobile operators and of the di¤erent customer groups do not coincide.

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Effects of political stability and sector regulations on investments in African mobile markets

Moshi

Mwakatumbula

2017

Telecommunications Policy

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Fixed-mobile integration

Cited by 4 publications

References 18 publications

The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey

The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey

Fixed-mobile substitution and termination rates

Effects of political stability and sector regulations on investments in African mobile markets

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