On "needing" Propositions and "looking for" Properties

Schwarz, Florian

doi:10.3765/salt.v16i0.2946

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…12 As far as Case is concerned, we can say that in the absence of incorporation, as in (9)-(10), need requires Case from have and in, respectively; a new car receives Case from of. 13 11 The proposal that transitive 'need' involves unpronounced HAVE recalls in part Larson, Den Dikken, and Ludlow 1997, Schwarz 2006, and Lechner 2007. However, these analyses have a different focus from ours in that they propose a structure whereby there is a HAVE embedded within a complement to verbal 'need', whereas we are focusing on what is found above nominal 'need'.…”

Section: Accounting For 'Need'mentioning

confidence: 80%

Having ‘Need’ and Needing ‘Have’

Harves

Kayne

2012

Linguistic Inquiry

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A survey of a number of the world’s languages reveals that only those languages that have a transitive verb used to express possession (i.e., Have-languages) also have a transitive verb ‘need’. No Be-language lacking a transitive verb for possession has a transitive verb ‘need’. This generalization suggests a Hale and Keyser ( 1993 , 2002 )–style incorporation approach, whereby nominal ‘need’ incorporates to an unpronounced verbal HAVE, yielding transitive verbal ‘need’.

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Section: Accounting For 'Need'mentioning

confidence: 80%

Having ‘Need’ and Needing ‘Have’

Harves

Kayne

2012

Linguistic Inquiry

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“…(29h) is analyzed as (35a); see Parsons, 1997) or of dropping a contextually supplied predicate (s.t. (29h) is analyzed as (35b); see den Dikken et al., 2018; Schwarz, 2006). (35) …”

Section: Special Properties Of Experiential Attitude Reportsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experiential Attitude Reports

Liefke

2023

Philosophy Compass

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One can remember events and one can remember facts:to remember an event (e.g. the barista's pouring my coffee this morning), one needs to have personally witnessed this event. To remember a fact (e.g. that the barista was trained in Italy), it suffices to have learned this fact from some other source. The distinction between event-directed (i.e. experiential) and fact-directed (or propositional) attitudes is an established distinction in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science that is also exemplified by other attitudes (incl. seeing, imagining, and dreaming). Until recently, semantics and the philosophy of language have assumed that experiential attitudes can be more or less straightforwardly reduced to propositional attitudes. However, new work has identified some key properties of experiential attitudes that cast doubt on this reducibility. The present paper discusses the most notable of these properties, focusing on experiential attitude reports. It links these properties to recent developments in formal and philosophical semantics in an effort to foster the development of a rigorous, empirically adequate account of experiential attitudes.

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“…Na verdade, assim como Ferreira (2009), há propostas que consideram que há um VP não pronunciado como argumento de querer, precisar, esperar, requerer etc., isto é, a criança quer [VP ter o bolo] -cf. Larson; Den Dikken; Ludlow (1997) eSchwarz (2006).…”

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