On monetary and non-monetary interventions to combat corruption

Abstract

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Anti-corruption policy-making, discretionary power, and institutional quality: An experimental analysis

“…In a bribery experiment, Abbink et al (2002) show that a small exogenous probability of detection (0.3%) combined with severe punishment (whereby detected subjects are excluded from the experiment without any payment) significantly reduces the likelihood of sending or accepting a bribe. Likewise, in a complex multi-stage embezzlement experiment with endogenous monitoring instead of an exogenous detection probability, Azfar and Nelson (2007) find that monitoring significantly discourages corrupt behaviour. Building on Azfar and Nelson (2007) 's design, show a relatively strong effect of detection and punishment on corruption.…”

“…Likewise, in a complex multi-stage embezzlement experiment with endogenous monitoring instead of an exogenous detection probability, Azfar and Nelson (2007) find that monitoring significantly discourages corrupt behaviour. Building on Azfar and Nelson (2007) 's design, show a relatively strong effect of detection and punishment on corruption. They find that a 44% increase in detection probability leads to a 27% decrease in embezzled resources.…”

“…Relatedly, Schikora (2011) concludes that the 'foureyes principle' actually increases corruption, all else being equal. Azfar and Nelson (2007) find that elected enforcement officers work harder at curbing corruption relative to those who are appointed to the role. Abbink and Ellman (2010) find that the use of intermediaries by aid donors to target beneficiaries can lead to increased embezzlement.…”

“…This is an issue that future research could fruitfully examine. A further explanation for this seemingly anomalous result is provided by Banerjee and Mitra (2018) . They show that a high detection probability (0.4) and a small fine has no effect on bribe taking behaviour, compared to a treatment with no monitoring.…”

“…Qualitative external validity only requires the direction of a causal effect to extend beyond the lab, whereas quantitative external validity additionally needs the causal effect be of similar size inside and outside the lab.8 The use of framed instructions in corruption experiments is common (see e.g Cameron et al, 2009 ;Armantier and Boly, 2013 ;Abbink et al, 2014;Banerjee and Mitra, 2018 )…”