2016
DOI: 10.35188/unu-wider/2016/131-4
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Anti-corruption policy-making, discretionary power, and institutional quality: An experimental analysis

Abstract: We analyse policymakers' incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that 'public officials', even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anticorruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own actions (legal equality), compared to a setting where it does not (legal inequality). More surprising perhaps is the finding that policy-makers do not choose a zero level of detection on average, even when it applies to them to… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
7
0

Year Published

2020
2020
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
3
1

Relationship

0
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4 publications
(12 citation statements)
references
References 43 publications
(56 reference statements)
0
7
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Accordingly, when all punishment conditions were compared with the control condition, the interaction of bribe size with punishment was significantly negative, t(471.3) = -2.30, p = .022, b = -0.114, 95% CI [-0.212, -0.017] (see Figure 3). That is, the effect of punishment was present only for high bribes, t(488.2) = -2.25, p = .025, b = -0.099, 95% CI [-0.185, -0.013], 6 and there was no effect for low bribes, t(484.8) = -0.17, p = .865, b = -0.007, 95% CI [-0.082, 0.069]. 6 Note that the threshold for "high" bribes (130 and higher) was selected based on Figure 3 and the significance of the effect is not robust to the threshold selection even if the pattern of results is similar.…”
Section: Effect Of Punishmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…Accordingly, when all punishment conditions were compared with the control condition, the interaction of bribe size with punishment was significantly negative, t(471.3) = -2.30, p = .022, b = -0.114, 95% CI [-0.212, -0.017] (see Figure 3). That is, the effect of punishment was present only for high bribes, t(488.2) = -2.25, p = .025, b = -0.099, 95% CI [-0.185, -0.013], 6 and there was no effect for low bribes, t(484.8) = -0.17, p = .865, b = -0.007, 95% CI [-0.082, 0.069]. 6 Note that the threshold for "high" bribes (130 and higher) was selected based on Figure 3 and the significance of the effect is not robust to the threshold selection even if the pattern of results is similar.…”
Section: Effect Of Punishmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That is, the effect of punishment was present only for high bribes, t(488.2) = -2.25, p = .025, b = -0.099, 95% CI [-0.185, -0.013], 6 and there was no effect for low bribes, t(484.8) = -0.17, p = .865, b = -0.007, 95% CI [-0.082, 0.069]. 6 Note that the threshold for "high" bribes (130 and higher) was selected based on Figure 3 and the significance of the effect is not robust to the threshold selection even if the pattern of results is similar. The effect of punishment for high bribes is not significant when the threshold is 110 (p = .088) and 120 (p = .058), but it is significant for threshold 140 (p = .022) and 150 (p = .024).…”
Section: Effect Of Punishmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Therefore, increased costs for political connections inevitably result in remarkable changes in pollution discharges. In addition, many corrupt officials are caught during the anti-corruption campaign which inevitably influences the duration of political connections (Boly & Gillanders, 2018).…”
Section: Hypothesis 3d: the Negative Effect Of Political Connections On Firms' Pollution Dischargesmentioning
confidence: 99%