We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. A testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974-75 to 1996-97. We …nd that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing. JEL Classi…cation: C72, D72

No abstract

‘If empirically meaningful interpersonal comparisons have to be based on indifference maps, as we have argued, then the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives must be violated. The information which enables us to assert that individual A prefers x to y more strongly than B prefers y to x must be based on comparisons by A and B of x and y not only to each other but also to other alternatives. Kenneth J. Arrow, ‘Social Choice and Individual Values, p. 112. In a framework of preferences over lotteries, we show that an axiom system consisting of weakened versions of Arrow's axioms has a unique solution. ‘Relative Utilitarianism’ consists of first normalizing individual von Neumann‐Morgenstern utilities between 0 and 1 and then summing them.

No abstract