On a network creation game

Fabrikant, Alex; Luthra, Ankur; Maneva, Elitza; Papadimitriou, Christos H.; Shenker, Scott

doi:10.1145/872035.872088

Cited by 408 publications

(582 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In such games, each user's objective is to minimize total formation cost while either minimizing distance to all other users [8], or ensuring connection to a given subset of nodes [2]. We consider a bound on edge costs, in the form of a limit on the number of in-edges at each node, and further, we focus on connections that allow specific flows of information.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-organizing flows in social networks

Hegde¹,

Massoulié

Viennot

2015

Theoretical Computer Science

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Social networks offer users new means of accessing information, essentially relying on "social filtering", i.e. propagation and filtering of information by social contacts. The sheer amount of data flowing in these networks, combined with the limited budget of attention of each user, makes it difficult to ensure that social filtering brings relevant content to interested users. Our motivation in this paper is to measure to what extent self-organization of a social network results in efficient social filtering.To this end we introduce flow games, a simple abstraction that models network formation under selfish dynamics, featuring user-specific * Part of this work was done while at Technicolor. † Supported by the Inria project-team "Gang" in the "LIAFA" laboratory and by the "LINCS" laboratory. 1interests and budget of attention. In the context of homogeneous user interests, we show that selfish dynamics converge to a stable network structure (namely a pure Nash equilibrium) with close-to-optimal information dissemination. We show that, in contrast, for the more realistic case of heterogeneous interests, selfish dynamics may lead to information dissemination that can be arbitrarily inefficient, as captured by an unbounded "price of anarchy".Nevertheless the situation differs when user interests exhibit a particular structure, captured by a metric space with low doubling dimension. In that case, natural autonomous dynamics converge to a stable configuration. Moreover, users obtain all the information of interest to them in the corresponding dissemination, provided their budget of attention is logarithmic in the size of their interest set.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-organizing flows in social networks

Hegde¹,

Massoulié

Viennot

2015

Theoretical Computer Science

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“…These studies assume that each node has the freedom to choose which links it maintains, whereas we assume that the overlay topology is constrained by a protocol. Moreover, our approach extends previously proposed cost models [4,6,9], by considering the load imposed on each node in addition to the distance to other nodes and degree of connectivity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Jackson and Wolinsky [9] proposed cost models to analyze formation strategies in social and economic networks. More recent studies [4,6] model (overlay) network formation as a non-cooperative game. These studies assume that each node has the freedom to choose which links it maintains, whereas we assume that the overlay topology is constrained by a protocol.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Cost of Participating in a Peer-to-Peer Network

Christin

Chuang

2005

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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In this paper, we model the cost incurred by each peer participating in a peer-to-peer network. Such a cost model allows to gauge potential disincentives for peers to collaborate, and provides a measure of the "total cost" of a network, which is a possible benchmark to distinguish between proposals. We characterize the cost imposed on a node as a function of the experienced load and the node connectivity, and show how our model applies to a few proposed routing geometries for distributed hash tables (DHTs). We further outline a number of open questions this research has raised.

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“…A number of studies have looked at network formation by selfish peers [29,11,17]. However, all of the studies assume behavioral homogeneity of peers, i.e.…”

Section: Question 11 How Can Those Inhomogeneities Influence the Behamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Complex Facets of Reputation and Trust

Aberer

Despotovic

Galuba

et al.

Computational Intelligence, Theory and Applications

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Summary. Trust and reputation systems have proven to be essential to enforcing cooperative behavior in peer-to-peer networks. We briefly describe the current approaches to building reputation systems: social networks formation, probabilistic estimation and game theoretic models. We then observe that all of the current models make a number of simplifying assumptions that may not necessarily hold in real networks, such as either irrational (probabilistic) or completely rational behavior, instant propagation of reputation information and homogeneity of interactions. We argue that dropping those assumptions and allowing more degrees of freedom is necessary in order to construct more realistic and rich reputation models. We support our argument by citing reputation research done in economics, evolutionary psychology, biology and sociology and and consider models that take into account adaptive behavior changes, co-evolution of behaviors, bounded rationality and variable interaction patterns. We then outline how those complexities can be dealt with and point out main directions for the future study of more realistic and less constrained reputation models that can potentially lead to construction of more secure, responsive and cooperative peer-to-peer systems.

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On a network creation game

Cited by 408 publications

References 8 publications

Self-organizing flows in social networks

Self-organizing flows in social networks

On the Cost of Participating in a Peer-to-Peer Network

The Complex Facets of Reputation and Trust

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