On the Cost of Participating in a Peer-to-Peer Network

Christin, Nicolas; Chuang, John

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30183-7_3

Cited by 19 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 24 publications

(54 reference statements)

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“…In [4], authors study a cost model for peers in deciding whether to join a P2P network. There are some work on the game-theoretic study of ISP traffic [26] and overlay traffic interaction and sevice differentiation [8], [13] In [11], [14], [15], [17], [22], [23], authors propose models on Internet pricing, but they focus on customer pricing strategy and issues to provide differentiated service.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We propose a distributed algorithm for higher tier ISPs to allocate their bandwidth resources to lower tier peers so as to avoid resource monopolization. 4. We show how a higher tier ISP can infer an optimal pricing so as to maximize its profit even under a competitive environment among other higher tier ISPs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…In practice, these private peering agreements can be quite complicated, involving many business considerations [7], [16], [4]. In [6], authors discuss how a provider should price its services differentially based on their characteristics such that prices can match service qualities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the Interaction and Competition among Internet Service Providers

Lee

Lui

2008

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

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The current Internet architecture comprises of different privately owned Internet service providers (ISPs) where higher tier ISPs supply connectivity service to lower tier ISPs and charge these ISPs for the transit service. For the higher tier ISPs, the main concern is how to increase the profit by attracting more lower tier ISPs (or traffic), while the lower tier ISPs concern about the connectivity, quality of service as well as the cost of the transit service. In this work, we seek to understand the interaction between different tiers of ISPs. Note that the lower tier ISPs can transmit traffic to each other, either by purchasing the service from higher tier ISPs, or by setting "private peering links" between themselves. Higher tier ISPs, on the other hand, cannot charge the transit service at will since there is competition among higher tier ISPs. We model the interaction of these ISPs via a game theoretic approach. We study the issues of (a) impact of private peering relationship among the lower tier ISPs, (b) under a competitive market, how can the higher tier ISPs perform resource allocation and revenue maximization so that resource monopoly can be avoided, and (c) conditions wherein higher tier ISPs are willing to perform network upgrade, in particular, when we scale up the network. Our mathematical framework provides insights on the interaction among ISPs and shows these ISPs can still gain profits as they upgrade the network infrastructures. Extensive simulations are carried out to quantify and support our theoretical claims.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

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On the Interaction and Competition among Internet Service Providers

Lee

Lui

2008

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

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“…(See [23].) Since the difference C 0 − C u quantifies the (dis)incentive to be a priori in the center of the star, Proposition 1 tells us that there is a (dis)incentive to be in the center of the star in a vast majority of cases.…”

Section: Star Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Proof: By induction on the dimension D. (See [23] for details.) For all u, R u immediately follows from ρ u,D with…”

Section: B D-dimensional Torimentioning

confidence: 99%

A cost-based analysis of overlay routing geometries

Christin

Chuang

Proceedings IEEE 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies.

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Abstract-In this paper, we propose a cost-based model to evaluate the resources that each node has to contribute for participating in an overlay network. Such a cost model allows to gauge potential disincentives for nodes to collaborate, and provides a measure of the "total cost" of a network, which is a possible benchmark to distinguish between different network architectures. We characterize the cost imposed on a node as a parametrized function of the experienced load and of the node connectivity, and express benefits in terms of cost reductions. We discuss the notions of social optimum and Nash equilibrium with respect to the proposed cost model. We show that the social optimum may significantly deviate from a Nash equilibrium when nodes value the resources they use to forward traffic on behalf of other nodes. Through analytical and numerical results, we then use the proposed cost model to evaluate some of the topologies recently proposed for overlay networks, and to exhibit some of the challenges systems designers may face. We conclude by outlining some of the open questions this research has raised.

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Modeling networked systems using the topologically distributed bounded rationality framework

2016

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In networked systems research, game theory is increasingly used to model a number of scenarios where distributed decision making takes place in a competitive environment. These scenarios include peer‐to‐peer network formation and routing, computer security level allocation, and TCP congestion control. It has been shown, however, that such modeling has met with limited success in capturing the real‐world behavior of computing systems. One of the main reasons for this drawback is that, whereas classical game theory assumes perfect rationality of players, real world entities in such settings have limited information, and cognitive ability which hinders their decision making. Meanwhile, new bounded rationality models have been proposed in networked game theory which take into account the topology of the network. In this article, we demonstrate that game‐theoretic modeling of computing systems would be much more accurate if a topologically distributed bounded rationality model is used. In particular, we consider (a) link formation on peer‐to‐peer overlay networks (b) assigning security levels to computers in computer networks (c) routing in peer‐to‐peer overlay networks, and show that in each of these scenarios, the accuracy of the modeling improves very significantly when topological models of bounded rationality are applied in the modeling process. Our results indicate that it is possible to use game theory to model competitive scenarios in networked systems in a way that closely reflects real world behavior, topology, and dynamics of such systems. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 21: 123–137, 2016

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On the Cost of Participating in a Peer-to-Peer Network

Cited by 19 publications

References 24 publications

On the Interaction and Competition among Internet Service Providers

On the Interaction and Competition among Internet Service Providers

A cost-based analysis of overlay routing geometries

Modeling networked systems using the topologically distributed bounded rationality framework

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