Objects of consciousness

Hoffman, Donald D.; Prakash, Chetan

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00577

Cited by 70 publications

(90 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…However, when we try to solve the mind-body problem-that is, to understand the relationship between neural activity and conscious experience-and then proceed to assume that neurons really do have causal powers and really do, somehow, cause our conscious experiences, then suddenly the fiction is no longer harmless. It has halted progress on the mind-body problem for decades, even centuries (Hoffman & Prakash, 2014).…”

Section: Shimon Edelmanmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We are not endorsing this ontology, but simply pointing to it as a possibility. We happen to be pursuing a different ontology (e.g., Hoffman & Prakash, 2014). But the key insight of ITP-that our perceptions are almost surely tuned to fitness rather than to objective reality-can be cashed out with many different theories of what that objective reality might be.…”

Section: Brian P Mclaughlin and E J Greenmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Probing the interface theory of perception: Reply to commentaries

2015

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We propose that selection favors nonveridical perceptions that are tuned to fitness. Current textbooks assert, to the contrary, that perception is useful because, in the normal case, it is veridical. Intuition, both lay and expert, clearly sides with the textbooks. We thus expected that some commentators would reject our proposal and provide counterarguments that could stimulate a productive debate. We are pleased that several commentators did indeed rise to the occasion and have argued against our proposal. We are also pleased that several others found our proposal worth exploring and have offered ways to test it, develop it, and link it more deeply to the history of ideas in the science and philosophy of perception. To both groups of commentators: thank you. Point and counterpoint, backed by data and theory, is the essence of science. We hope that the exchange recorded here will advance the scientific understanding of perception and its evolution. In what follows, we respond to the commentaries in alphabetical order.Keywords Bayesian inference . Parameter estimation . Perceptual categorization and identification . Visual perception . Categorization Barton AndersonWhere does fitness fit in theories of perception? doi:10.3758/ s13423-014-0748-5Overview (1) Anderson argues that, BFor the games they considered, the only 'force' of adaptation was through natural selection. In such cases, perception should indeed track utility directly. But the same doesn't hold if animals can adjust their behavior to meet homeostatic demands on ontogenetic time scales.^We reply that time scale and ontogenetics are irrelevant to the issue of tracking utility. (2) Anderson says, BIf the 'payoff' function of homeostasis is nonmonotonic, as is typical, then the perceptual response needs to track resources monotonically so that an animal can know to adapt its behavior to achieve homeostasis.^We explain why this is false. (3) Anderson argues that our characterization of perceptual strategies using an abstract set of world states W assumes a BGod's eye view^of the world and Bmisses a fundamental point about what constitutes both the objects of science and experience; the fundamental elements of system description in science are observables, not unspecifiable 'world states'.^We explain how our abstract approach serves to avoid a God's eye view, and how it engages the standard interaction of theory, observables, and experiments that is central to science. (4) Anderson claims that our argument for redefining the notion of perceptual illusion is that, BSince we have no access to the 'true' world states, it is impossible to ever determine whether perception is veridical (in their sense) or in error, which leads them to the conclusion that such distinctions can only be defined in terms of adaptive behavior.^We explain that this is not our argument, and then explain what our real argument is. (5) Anderson proposes to define veridical perception in terms of the coherence between different observables. We explain why this is misleading an...

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Section: Shimon Edelmanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Brian P Mclaughlin and E J Greenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probing the interface theory of perception: Reply to commentaries

2015

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“…Koenderink, 2014; also see Hoffman, 2012;Hoffman & Prakash, 2014;Rogers, 2014). We focus particularly on how the all-seeing view of perception manifests itself in research on rationality, cognition, and decision-making.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rationality, Perception, and the All-Seeing Eye

Felin¹

2017

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Seeing-perception and vision-is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman's arguments against the omniscience of economic agents-and the concept of bounded rationality-depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an Ball-seeing eye.^We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon's pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman's work-particularly his article BMaps of Bounded Rationality^-to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics-the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.

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“…First, my argument is, again, a schematic defense of visual content. That is, even if one thinks that naïve realists could have other explanations of perceptual error in their repertoire, the opponent could replace the first step of the argument with similar criticisms of the alternative 14 Travis (2004: 73).…”

Section: Content Comes Backmentioning

confidence: 99%