Probing the interface theory of perception: Reply to commentaries

Abstract

We propose that selection favors nonveridical perceptions that are tuned to fitness. Current textbooks assert, to the contrary, that perception is useful because, in the normal case, it is veridical. Intuition, both lay and expert, clearly sides with the textbooks. We thus expected that some commentators would reject our proposal and provide counterarguments that could stimulate a productive debate. We are pleased that several commentators did indeed rise to the occasion and have argued against our proposal. We are also pleased that several others found our proposal worth exploring and have offered ways to test it, develop it, and link it more deeply to the history of ideas in the science and philosophy of perception. To both groups of commentators: thank you. Point and counterpoint, backed by data and theory, is the essence of science. We hope that the exchange recorded here will advance the scientific understanding of perception and its evolution. In what follows, we respond to the commentaries in alphabetical order.Keywords Bayesian inference . Parameter estimation . Perceptual categorization and identification . Visual perception . Categorization Barton AndersonWhere does fitness fit in theories of perception? doi:10.3758/ s13423-014-0748-5Overview (1) Anderson argues that, BFor the games they considered, the only 'force' of adaptation was through natural selection. In such cases, perception should indeed track utility directly. But the same doesn't hold if animals can adjust their behavior to meet homeostatic demands on ontogenetic time scales.^We reply that time scale and ontogenetics are irrelevant to the issue of tracking utility. (2) Anderson says, BIf the 'payoff' function of homeostasis is nonmonotonic, as is typical, then the perceptual response needs to track resources monotonically so that an animal can know to adapt its behavior to achieve homeostasis.^We explain why this is false. (3) Anderson argues that our characterization of perceptual strategies using an abstract set of world states W assumes a BGod's eye view^of the world and Bmisses a fundamental point about what constitutes both the objects of science and experience; the fundamental elements of system description in science are observables, not unspecifiable 'world states'.^We explain how our abstract approach serves to avoid a God's eye view, and how it engages the standard interaction of theory, observables, and experiments that is central to science. (4) Anderson claims that our argument for redefining the notion of perceptual illusion is that, BSince we have no access to the 'true' world states, it is impossible to ever determine whether perception is veridical (in their sense) or in error, which leads them to the conclusion that such distinctions can only be defined in terms of adaptive behavior.^We explain that this is not our argument, and then explain what our real argument is. (5) Anderson proposes to define veridical perception in terms of the coherence between different observables. We explain why this is misleading an...

The Interface Theory of Perception

“…This has been done, and the conclusion is clear: Veridical perceptual strategies are never more fit than equally complex nonveridical strategies that are tuned to the relevant fitness functions (Hoffman, Singh, & Prakash, 2015a, 2015b; Mark, Marion, & Hoffman, 2010). When they compete, veridical strategies are routinely driven to extinction.…”

“…A comprehensive introduction to the interface theory of perception. Hoffman, D. D., Singh, M., & Prakash, C. (2015b). (See References).…”

What Are Visual Illusions?*

“…(pp. 1051-1052) In contrast, in a radical stance, Hoffman et al (2015) doubted that even a single appropriate description and representation of the world is available to us, writing that our perceptions almost surely do not track the structure of W [the world], which entails that some assumptions that we naturally make about W-such as that it has three dimensions of space, a dimension of time, and contains physical objects with properties such as mass and position-are almost surely false. (p. 1553)…”

Phenomenology of perceptual illusions.

“…Therefore, both perception and illusions are the normal outcome of neurophysiological activity triggered by the first- and second-order stimulus. Hence, phenomenology is linked to the physical world (physical objects and stimuli), in relation to which it can be considered a simple and useful interface (Hoffman, Singh, & Prakash, 2015b).…”