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AbstractThe article discusses the issue of nuclear-propelled submarines as a nuclear non-proliferation question, addresses the issue of safeguards procedures and arrangements, and suggests a broader, political approach to allay international concerns. Such safeguards arrangement would set the precedent for future arrangements, and particularly if integrated into a more comprehensive approach, might strengthen Brazil's hand in nuclear negotiations, including on disarmament.Keywords: Nuclear submarines, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safeguards, Brazil, International Atomic Energy Agency, Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Introduction N uclear propulsion for military use, more frequently in submarines, is considered a loophole in the nuclear non-proliferation regime (Ma & Von Hippel, 2001;Moltz 1998;2005;Thielmann and Hoffman 2012); for a different view, see Guimarães 2005). That is is because nuclear propulsion for military craft isa Non-Proscribed Military Activity (NPMA), and the nuclear material used in reactors for that specific purpose is not subject to safeguards. During the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty -NPT, -it became clear that some prospective members might not join it out of interest in nuclear propulsion for ships and concern about how NPT might impact that. Should safeguards be applied in that case, much of the discretion that is the raison d'être of a submarine in the first place would be compromised or forfeited. But even then, in the late 1960s, it was already considered "a serious loophole in the safeguards prescribed by the Treaty") (Fischer 1997, 272) because during the unsafeguarded periods of its life-cycle, the nuclear material in the reactor could be diverted for the production of nuclear weapons. The risk increases with the degree of enrichment of the nuclear material: if the uranium in the reactor is enriched to around 90% 235 U (usually called weapons-grade uranium 1 ), it could be directly used in nuclear weapons; if it is enriched to around 20% or more 235 U (usually referred to highly-enriched uranium or HEU), it could easily be enriched to weapon-grade uranium. Uranium enriched to less than 20% 235 U is usually called low-enriched uranium or LEU and, at a level below 10% 235 U, it becomes more difficult to substantially enrich to weapons-grade uranium 2 or close to it (Barroso 2009;Bernstein 2008;Bodansky 2004;Heriot 1988;Murray 2001) 3 . Uranium for land-based nuclear reactors is usually enriched to around 3.5%-5% 235 U. Therefore, from a nuclear nonproliferation standpoint, risks would be minimized if naval nuclear reactors had LEU, and particularly less than 10% 235 U content, as its nuclear fissile material.
Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz CostaAs a practical matter, this w...