Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity

Plunkett, David

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1656375

Cited by 8 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…This raises an epistemological issue: given that our existing normative concepts might be imperfect (or perhaps even seriously defective), why should we think that a conceptual ethics project will help us to identify normative 57 See (McPherson and Plunkett Forthcoming). This epistemological challenge is closely related to the metaphysical one discussed in (Eklund 2017), which we discuss in (McPherson 2020) and (Plunkett 2020).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Conceptual ethics, metaepistemology, and normative epistemology

McPherson

Plunkett

2021

Inquiry

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This paper advertises the importance of distinguishing three different foundational projects about epistemic thought and talk, which we call "systematic normative epistemology", "metaepistemology", and "the conceptual ethics of epistemology". We argue that these projects can be distinguished by their contrasting constitutive success conditions. This paper is motivated by the idea that the distinctions between these three projects matter for epistemological theorizing in ways that have been underappreciated in philosophical discussion. We claim that attention to the threefold distinction we advance allows us to better understand and evaluate existing views and debates in the field; identify and appreciate new or underexplored theoretical options in the field; and avoid important defects and ambiguities in our research on epistemic topics.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 88%