Topic Continuity in Conceptual Engineering and Beyond

McPherson, Tristram; Plunkett, David

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2021.1980095

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 30 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Or at least they might be "continuous" in relevant ways that would block charges of "changing the subject" when there is a shift from one topic to another. (For discussion, see Cappelen 2018;Kocurek 2022;McPherson and Plunkett 2021c;and Thomasson 2020. ) If that is right, then we might shift from one "legal-ish" concept to another and still count as talking about the same topic of law or legal interpretation, at least when the question of "topic continuity" is evaluated in certain contexts, given certain concerns.…”

Section: Legal Interpretation Conceptual Ethics and Alternative Legal...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal Interpretation, Conceptual Ethics, and Alternative Legal Concepts

Plunkett

2023

Ratio Juris

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When legal theorists ask questions about legal interpretation—such as what it fundamentally is, what it aims at, or how it should work—they often do so in ways closely tethered to existing legal practice. For example: they try to understand how an activity legal actors (purportedly) already engage in should be done better, such as how judges can better learn about the content of the law. In this paper, I discuss a certain kind of “conceptual ethics” approach to thinking about legal interpretation, which is less tethered to existing legal practice (or the existing meaning of core pieces of legal terminology). The approach I explore asks questions about legal interpretation in a way that is tethered to what legal (or “legal‐ish”) concepts people should deploy, as part of arguments on behalf of engaging in legal (or “legal‐ish”) practices different from our current ones. In exploring this approach, I aim to help us better understand the landscape of philosophical issues about legal interpretation, including parts of it that I think have been underexplored.

show abstract

Section: Legal Interpretation Conceptual Ethics and Alternative Legal...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal Interpretation, Conceptual Ethics, and Alternative Legal Concepts

Plunkett

2023

Ratio Juris

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We can also think of Π in terms of the equivalence relation " Π , where x " Π y iff there is some A P Π such that x, y P A. See Parry 1968;Perry 1989;Railton 1993;Yablo 2014;Fine 2016;Cappelen 2018;Hawke 2018;McPherson and Plunkett 2021 for alternative approaches.…”

Section: Topics and Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another natural response is to reject premise 1. The claim that conceptual revision is impossible relies on contentious views about the ontology of concepts (Haslanger, 2000(Haslanger, , 2020Brigandt, 2010;Sawyer, 2018Sawyer, , 2020aPrinzing, 2018;Richard, 2019;Ball, 2020;Thomasson, 2020;McPherson and Plunkett, 2021). If concepts are abstract objects, then one may be unable to change their intrinsic properties (though see Thomasson 2021).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

What topic continuity problem?

Kocurek

2022

Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A common objection to the very idea of conceptual engineering is the topic continuity problem: whenever one tries to "reengineer" a concept, one only shifts attention away from one concept to another. Put differently, there is no such thing as conceptual revision: there's only conceptual replacement. Here, I show that topic continuity is compatible with conceptual replacement. Whether the topic is preserved in an act of conceptual replacement simply depends on what is being replaced (a conceptual tool or a conceptual role) and what the topic under discussion is. Thus, the topic continuity problem only arises from a failure to specify these two things.Also known as the "changing the subject objection" or "Strawson's challenge".

show abstract

The playing field of empirical facts: on the interrelations between moral and empirical beliefs in reflective equilibrium

Cordes

2024

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What exactly is the role of empirical beliefs in moral reflective equilibrium (RE)? And if they have a part to play, can changes in our empirical beliefs effectuate changes in the moral principles we adopt? Conversely, can empirical beliefs be adjusted in light of certain moral convictions? While it is generally accepted that empirical background theory is of importance to the method of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE), this article focuses on a different aspect, namely the role of empirical beliefs that is intrinsic to the coherence relation of moral beliefs in any (narrow or wide) conception of RE. First, it is shown that in the application of RE, empirical beliefs are crucial to the procedure of matching principles to considered judgments. Changes in our empirical beliefs may therefore upset the relevant coherence relation and motivate changes in the moral principles we adopt. This more detailed account of the interplay between empirical and moral beliefs can help evaluate the overall philosophical appeal of RE. Finally, it is argued that, at least in WRE, the relation between empirical and moral beliefs need not be a one-way street, that is, moral convictions can provide us with some epistemic means of adjudicating between competing empirical descriptions of the world.

show abstract

Topic Continuity in Conceptual Engineering and Beyond

Cited by 4 publications

References 30 publications

Legal Interpretation, Conceptual Ethics, and Alternative Legal Concepts

Legal Interpretation, Conceptual Ethics, and Alternative Legal Concepts

What topic continuity problem?

The playing field of empirical facts: on the interrelations between moral and empirical beliefs in reflective equilibrium

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About