Normative foundations of human cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Schurtenberger, Ivo

doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0385-5

Cited by 309 publications

(312 citation statements)

References 147 publications

(180 reference statements)

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“…Finally, my ndings also closely relate to previous studies on whether variations in social norms translate into variations in actual behavior and/or investigating norms under initial ignorance (e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013;Gächter et al, 2013;Gächter et al, 2017;Grossman and van der Weele, 2017;Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018). I am the rst to document a norm for punishing selsh dictators as well as a strong norm for revealing information about whether a norm violation took place.…”

Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 76%

The benefit of the doubt: willful ignorance and altruistic punishment

Stüber

2019

Exp Econ

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.Altruistic punishment is often thought to be a major enforcement mechanism of social norms. I present experimental results from a modified version of the dictator game with third-party punishment, in which third parties can remain ignorant about the choice of the dictator. I find that a substantial fraction of subjects choose not to reveal the dictator's choice and not to punish the dictator. I show that this behavior is in line with the social norms that prevail in a situation of initial ignorance. Remaining ignorant and choosing not to punish is not inappropriate. As a result, altruistic punishment is significantly lower when the dictator's choice is initially hidden. The decrease in altruistic punishment leads to more selfish dictator behavior only if dictators are explicitly informed about the effect of willful ignorance on punishment rates. Hence, in scenarios in which third parties can ignore information and dictators know what this implies, third-party punishment may only ineffectively enforce social norms.

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Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 76%

The benefit of the doubt: willful ignorance and altruistic punishment

Stüber

2019

Exp Econ

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“…At the same time, our paper helps to augment the discussion regarding the role of norm activation in guiding behavior (Cialdini et al, 1991;Kallgren et al, 2000). It remains a point of debate whether norm salience affects the empirical or normative beliefs of a social norm (Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018). We attempt to answer these questions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…A different stream of literature examines the role of social norms in disrupting old, informing current, and guiding future behavior. Research in environments in which social norms are clearly defined and communicated to the individuals finds that social norms motivate and affect both self and other-regarding decisions (see Cialdini et al, 1990;Bicchieri, 2006Bicchieri, , 2016Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018). These situations involve a trade-off between what someone wants to do for one's own benefit (self-serving behavior) and what they want to do for the benefit of others (other-regarding behavior).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

It's Not a Lie If You Believe It: Lying and Belief Distortion Under Norm-Uncertainty

Bicchieri,

Dimant

2018

SSRN Journal

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We explore the relationship between norm-uncertainty and lying. Lies are ubiquitous, and people often lie for their own benefit or for the benefit of others. Research in environments in which social norms are clearly defined and communicated finds that social norms influence personal decisions, even when they are not in our own self-interest. We deviate from this approach and study lying under norm uncertainty with scope for opportunistic interpretation of the norm. We introduce variation along three dimensions: salience of different types of norm-uncertainty (normative/empirical), the beneficiary of the lie (self/other), and ex-ante knowledge about the opportunity to tell a lie in order to tease out potential belief-distortion mechanisms. We also find compelling evidence that individuals engage in self-serving belief distortion to increase lying overall. However, we observe this only when uncertainty about what others do (empirical uncertainty), but not when uncertainty about what others approve of (normative uncertainty) is made salient. We also observe conditional liars, but only when the lie is self-serving rather than to the benefit of a third party. We discuss policy implications to improve the effectiveness of norm-based interventions.

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“…: . A number of examples have been found by ethologists in nature whereby several species display punishment providing the individuals with an option to attempt increasing their own fitness (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995), but whether or not this behaviour prompts a higher use of cooperation or, rather, retaliation is still a question open to debate in humans and other species (Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011;Balliet et al, 2011;Baumard, 2010;Bone et al, 2016;Boyd et al, 2010;Dong et al, 2019;Fehr and Gachter, 2002;Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018;Fowler et al, 2005;Gächter et al, 2008;Gao et al, 2015;Hilbe et al, 2014;Janssen and Bushman, 2008;Li et al, 2018;Nikiforakis, 2008;Raihani and Bshary, 2015;Raihani et al, 2012;Riehl and Frederickson, 2016;Wubs et al, 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Segregating socioeconomic classes leads to an unequal redistribution of wealth

2020

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Social living groups are organised in social hierarchies often exhibiting inequalities in beings. Investigating class segregation and the use of punishment applied downward in the rank acts as a key aspect to ascertain how dominant and subordinate partners cooperate to achieve mutual profit. In human subjects coming from countries with an uneven wealth distribution, this mutual profit may be reduced, especially for the lower socioeconomic classes. We implemented an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game experiment in one such country with starkly high inequality, China. We split relatively richer and poorer subjects into separate classes and gave only one the authority to punish the other. When rich subjects could unidirectionally punish poor subjects (as in a segregated society), rich subjects decreased their cooperation effort while punishing poor subjects. When rich and poor subjects, instead, could punish each other in random combinations (as in an integrated society) they decreased defections so they could punish more. In the segregated society model, the punishing classes earned twice as much as the non-punishers. Conversely, in the integrated society model, weak differences in earnings were found, leading to a decrease in inequality. These results were confirmed by an agent-based simulation mirroring the human experiments and repeated during a very large number of rounds. From our research, we conclude that, especially in developing economies, if the states enacted that the dominant and subordinate individuals relinquished their almost segregated state, this would lead to a redistribution of wealth and power.

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Normative foundations of human cooperation

Cited by 309 publications

References 147 publications

The benefit of the doubt: willful ignorance and altruistic punishment

The benefit of the doubt: willful ignorance and altruistic punishment

It's Not a Lie If You Believe It: Lying and Belief Distortion Under Norm-Uncertainty

Segregating socioeconomic classes leads to an unequal redistribution of wealth

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