The benefit of the doubt: willful ignorance and altruistic punishment

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.Altruistic punishment is often thought to be a major enforcement mechanism of social norms. I present experimental results from a modified version of the dictator game with third-party punishment, in which third parties can remain ignorant about the choice of the dictator. I find that a substantial fraction of subjects choose not to reveal the dictator's choice and not to punish the dictator. I show that this behavior is in line with the social norms that prevail in a situation of initial ignorance. Remaining ignorant and choosing not to punish is not inappropriate. As a result, altruistic punishment is significantly lower when the dictator's choice is initially hidden. The decrease in altruistic punishment leads to more selfish dictator behavior only if dictators are explicitly informed about the effect of willful ignorance on punishment rates. Hence, in scenarios in which third parties can ignore information and dictators know what this implies, third-party punishment may only ineffectively enforce social norms.

“Proof Under Reasonable Doubt”: Ambiguity of the Norm Violation as Boundary Condition of Third-Party Punishment

“…As a second plausible mechanism, we considered that ambiguity might provide a situational justification or “moral wiggle room” for those who intend to remain passive, and thus, avoid incurring costs ( Dana et al, 2007 ; Stüber, 2020 ). Our research does not offer clear evidence in this direction.…”

“…Conversely, third parties whose main goal is to avoid incurring costs do not gain from resolving the ambiguity. On the contrary, some might find keeping the situation ambiguous beneficial to uphold a situational justification for remaining passive ( Dana et al, 2007 ; Stüber, 2020 ).…”

No Moral Wiggle Room in an Experimental Corruption Game

“…Grossman ( 2014 ) shows that the share of dictators who remain ignorant depends crucially on whether ignorance is an act of commission or omission. Recent literature explores willful ignorance in altruistic punishment (Kriss et al, 2016 ; Stüber, 2019 ) and shows that approximately a third of participants decide to remain ignorant about selfish dictators, in order to avoid the costs of punishing them. Felgendreher ( 2018 ) finds very little evidence for willful ignorance in a very different context (purchase of ethically certified products) compared to distributional games typically played in the economic lab.…”

ISM approach to model financial risks in Indian KPO organization

“…It includes costs such as switching, layoff, contractual amendments, and adaptation (Hamilton et al, 2020). Financial risks are often overlooked initially but can emerge as hidden costs later on (Stüber, 2020). Research on risk mitigation in KPO has yielded successful results through various approaches.…”