Normative Ethics Does Not Need a Foundation: It Needs More Science

Abstract

The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights.

How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences

“…However, in line with previous interpretations, we contend that Hume's and Moore's fallacies in the first place preclude deductive inferences that are, respectively, not valid and not sound (cf. Schurz, 1997 ; Pigden, 2010 ; Quintelier et al, 2011 ).…”

Universal Ethics: Organized Complexity as an Intrinsic Value

“…How and in how far we should be inspired by evolutionary processes to build a normative ethics remains a huge debate worth pursuing (see e.g. Maienschein and Ruse 1999;Quintelier, Speybroeck, and Braeckman 2011).…”

Normative nursing ethics: A literature review and tentative recommendations

“…Empirical inquiry, then, can discover facts that are indispensable for making moral arguments about the sort of real-world policies and practices in which bioethicists and clinicians are interested. 10 But empirical inquiry alone is insufficient for drawing moral conclusions-that is the insight behind Hume's 11 famous explanation of the "is/ought" gap, and (expressing essentially the same idea) Moore's 12 discussion of the "naturalistic fallacy": one cannot legitimately infer normative conclusions (claims about what ought to be the case) from non-normative premises alone (claims about what is the case). To reach a moral conclusion, you need a moral starting-point-that is, some sort of moral-theoretical premise or moral principle, which is by its nature not empirically discoverable.…”