Experimental philosophers and psychologists investigate whether people perceive moral judgments to be objectively true or false. Existing research focuses on a single dimension of 'perceived objectivity'. The present research examines whether multiple dimensions of folk moral objectivity underlie moral judgments. It also examines whether such dimensions relate to perceived objectivity, tolerance, and people's behavioral intentions to punish norm-violators. Exploratory factor analysis on twenty ethical items revealed three different ways of perceiving moral truth (Independent Truth, Universal Truth, Divine Truth), which each form reliable subscales (Study 1). This three-factor structure was supported by confirmatory factor analysis (Study 2). Each of the dimensions is differently related to perceived objectivity (Study 3). With respect to tolerance, perceived objectivity is a mediator in the relationship between perceiving moral truth as absolute or universal and tolerance (Study 4). With respect to a willingness to harm measure, Independent Truth is negatively related and Universal Truth is positively related, to people's punitive attitudes toward norm-violators.

In adolescence, being socially successful depends to a large extent on being popular with peers. Even though some youths have what it takes to be popular, they are not, whereas others seem to have a secret ingredient that just makes the difference. In this study the G-allele of a functional polymorphism in the promotor region of the 5HT2A serotonin receptor gene (-G1438A) was identified as a secret ingredient for popularity among peers. These findings build on and extend previous work by Burt (2008, 2009). Tackling limitations from previous research, the role of the 5HT2A serotonin receptor gene was examined in adolescent males (N = 285; average age 13) using a unique sample of the TRAILS study. Carrying the G-allele enhanced the relation between aggression and popularity, particularly for those boys who have many female friends. This seems to be an “enhancer” effect of the G-allele whereby popularity relevant characteristics are made more noticeable. There is no “popularity gene”, as the G-allele by itself had no effect on popularity.

No abstract

In this paper I argue that there are at least two ways in which people can be moral objectivists, namely implicitly and explicitly. It is possible to explicitly deny being a moral objectivist while being implicitly committed to it. (Enoch, Shafer and Landau (eds), The Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, 192-205, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014) presents three thought experiments to convince his reader that they are moral objectivists even if they explicitly think otherwise. As it happens, Enoch's tests, which he uses as intuition pumps, provide excellent measures of implicit metaethical commitments. In this paper I use each of them as material for survey experiments to test whether people are implicit moral objectivists. Overall, results provide support for the idea that people are moral objectivists.

A prevalent assumption among philosophers is that people are moral objec-tivists, which I refer to as the thesis of folk moral objectivism (FMO). Recent psychological research appears to shed doubt on FMO. For instance, even though people seem to treat some moral statements as objectively true or false, they treat other moral statements as subjectively true or false, or even as neither true nor false. Moreover, there seem to be large differences between different individuals with regard to the objectivity that they attribute to morality. In this paper I investigate whether the findings of psychological research provide evidence that shows that FMO is true or false. My analysis reveals, firstly, that many of the empirical measures that are used in psychological research do not directly pertain to FMO. Secondly, those measures that seem to pertain to FMO may elicit explicit commitments. According to some philosophers, however, FMO concerns people's implicit commitments. I conclude that the thesis of folk moral objectivism is not (yet) debunked by existing research.