How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences

Quintelier, Katinka; Zijlstra, Lieuwe

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Importantly, empirical descriptions of the world cannot be used to deductively infer normative conclusions ( Hume, 1739–1740 ; Moore, 1903 ). Nonetheless, empirical findings about what people do can have normative implications, or implications about what people should do, in other, non-deductive ways ( Nesteruk, 1992 ; Schurz, 1997 ; Harris and Freeman, 2008 ; Quintelier et al, 2011 ; Quintelier and Zijlstra, 2014 ; Werhane, 2019 ; Prochownik, 2021 ). Specifically, the empirical findings in this paper suggest that corporate experience is an important, but relatively overlooked, argument in the normative debate about corporate moral standing.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stakeholder-Oriented Firms Have Feelings and Moral Standing Too

Quintelier

2022

Front. Psychol.

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A central claim in stakeholder theory is that, if we see stakeholders as human beings, we will attribute higher moral standing or show more moral consideration to stakeholders. But would the same hold for firms? In this paper, I apply the concepts of humanization and moral standing to firms, and I predict that (1) individuals attribute higher moral standing to stakeholder-oriented than to profit-oriented firms, because (2) individuals attribute more experience (such as feelings) to stakeholder-oriented than to profit-oriented firms. Five experiments support these predictions across different operationalizations of stakeholder and profit orientations. The analyses show that moral standing attributions are not fully explained by attributions of agency (such as thinking) to firms, or by attributions of experience or agency to human stakeholders (instead of firms). By unearthing the importance of experience attributions for moral standing attributions to firms, this work provides novel insights in ongoing legal, philosophical and public debates related to firms’ moral standing. The findings also bring the debate about firms’ moral standing to the heart of stakeholder theory, and lead to new normative and descriptive research questions about the interests of firms and their stakeholders.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stakeholder-Oriented Firms Have Feelings and Moral Standing Too

Quintelier

2022

Front. Psychol.

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Towards an Ethical Machine: One test at a time

Highstead¹

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Machines performing as artificial agents, such as autonomous vehicles, are becoming more frequent in society and are interacting directly with human beings.Because social interaction is grounded in ethical norms, artificial agents also need to behave in accordance with the ethical norms of the society in which they operate. To be accepted by society, an artificial agent must incorporate moral judgment in the performance of its tasks. Artificial moral agents would, therefore, be seen as safe and courteous in their daily intercourse with people. To accomplish this, requires a methodology that can communicate ethical values from an ethical domain of discourse to the scientific domain of engineering design and development.

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How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences

Cited by 2 publications

References 17 publications

Stakeholder-Oriented Firms Have Feelings and Moral Standing Too

Stakeholder-Oriented Firms Have Feelings and Moral Standing Too

Towards an Ethical Machine: One test at a time

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