Non-rational aspects of skilled agency

Abstract

This paper criticizes two closely connected rationalist views about human agency. The first of these views, rationalism about agential control, claims that the capacities for agential control in normal adult human beings are rational capacities. The second view, rationalism about action, claims that the capacities for agential control in virtue of which the things we do count as our actions are rational capacities. The arguments of the paper focus on aspects of technical skills that control integral details of skillful action, like the details of a baseball player's pitching technique. I argue that these aspects of technical skills are largely nonrational capacities, but are nonetheless capacities for agential control, and can help make the things we do count as actions. While rational capacities do have a central role in human agency, their importance should not lead us to neglect the significant constitutive role of non-rational capacities in our agency.

Modest Sociality, Minimal Cooperation and Natural Intersubjectivity

“…10 And the action can be intentional under more than one description (Davidson 1963), depending on the plan/sub-plan that we choose to highlight. 11 Luthra (2016) calls this kind of view Rationalism about agential control: whereby "our ability to determine, as agents, how we act consists solely in guidance of our actions through the exercise of those sorts of rational capacities-capacities for intention, practical judgment, practical reasoning, and the like" (Luthra 2016(Luthra : 2272 reference (Campbell 2002;Dickie 2015) -a way of specifying particular objects, processes, features, locations or events within one's perceptual field, that makes them accessible to thought; 'this thing over here' and 'that thing over there'. In doing this, attention can act as a kind of interface between world, thought and action (Campbell 2002, Ch 7).…”

What Is Minimally Cooperative Behavior?

“…Or one can make use of a combination of these and guide one's attention in a 'top-down' manner in order to find something that will grab one's attention and 'pop-out' from the scene.10 And the action can be intentional under more than one description(Davidson 1963), depending on the plan/sub-plan that we choose to highlight.11 Luthra (2016) calls this kind of view Rationalism about agential control: whereby "our ability to determine, as agents, how we act consists solely in guidance of our actions through the exercise of those sorts of rational capacities-capacities for intention, practical judgment, practical reasoning, and the like"(Luthra 2016(Luthra : 2272 8 Modest Sociality, Minimal Cooperation and Natural Intersubjectivity…”