How Knowing-That and Knowing-How Interface in Action: The Intelligence of Motor Representations

Ferretti, G.; Caiani, Silvano Zipoli

doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00395-9

Cited by 6 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 118 publications

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“…Importantly, the hypothesis that executable action concepts are encoded in a motor format explains the available evidence better than the hypothesis according to which executable action concepts and motor representations rely on separate mental substrates and formats (Ferretti & Zipoli Caiani, 2018, 2021). Again, if the executable action concepts and the related motor representations were encoded by different representational formats, there would be no reason to expect that an impairment of the agent’s motor system would affect the functional processing of action categories.…”

Section: The Motor Representation Of (Executable) Action Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…The main argument supporting the SFT is based on the assumption that the executable concepts of actions and the related motor representations share the same realizers in the cognitive-motoric system. This argument relies on three types of well-established evidence (here we provide only a taste of the empirical findings supporting SFT; for an accurate review, see Ferretti & Zipoli Caiani, 2018, 2021).…”

Section: The Motor Representation Of (Executable) Action Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 9. Concerning the differences between the SFT and other theses in the literature on the interface problem (e.g., Burnston, 2017; Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014; Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2017; Shepherd, 2019), see Ferretti and Zipoli Caiani (2018, 2021). …”

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confidence: 99%

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On knowledge in action

Ferretti

Caiani

2023

Theory & Psychology

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What mental states guide the execution of our actions? It is generally agreed that the execution of an action is guided by the relevant knowledge state concerning how to perform that action. However, not all agree on which mental states underlie such a knowledge. Some suggest that knowing how to perform an action has mainly to do with the propositional representation about the way to execute that action. Those opposing this view stress the role of the motor, non-propositional representation as the mental state responsible for action performance. The aim of this article is to overcome this dichotomy by showing that an explanation of the cognitive processes underlying knowing how to perform an action needs both propositional and motor states. We defend this view by providing an account of the way in which our propositional knowledge about an action is constituted by the motor representation that guides the execution of that action.

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Section: The Motor Representation Of (Executable) Action Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: The Motor Representation Of (Executable) Action Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On knowledge in action

Ferretti

Caiani

2023

Theory & Psychology

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“…For discussion of this set of issues, see Burnston (2017aBurnston ( , 2017bBurnston ( , 2020, Toribio (2018aToribio ( , 2018b, Quilty-Dunn (2020a), Mylopoulos (2021), Shepherd (2021), andFerretti andCaiani (forthcoming). I thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this list of citations.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The truth of this latter claim depends on theories of concept/symbol acquisition, as well as on what counts as cognitive penetration. For discussion of this set of issues, see Burnston (2017a, 2017b, 2020), Toribio (2018a, 2018b), Quilty‐Dunn (2020a), Mylopoulos (2021), Shepherd (2021), and Ferretti and Caiani (forthcoming). I thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this list of citations.…”

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confidence: 99%

Perceptual learning

Jenkin

2023

Philosophy Compass

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Perception provides us with access to the external world, but that access is shaped by our own experiential histories.Through perceptual learning, we can enhance our capacities for perceptual discrimination, categorization, and attention to salient properties. We can also encode harmful biases and stereotypes. This article reviews interdisciplinary research on perceptual learning, with an emphasis on the implications for our rational and normative theorizing. Perceptual learning raises the possibility that our inquiries into topics such as epistemic justification, aesthetic criticism, and moral knowledge should include not only an examination of cognition but also of perception.

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Habits, Motor Representations and Practical Modes of Presentation

Ferretti,

Zipoli Caiani

2023

Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics

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How Knowing-That and Knowing-How Interface in Action: The Intelligence of Motor Representations

Cited by 6 publications

References 118 publications

On knowledge in action

On knowledge in action

Perceptual learning

Habits, Motor Representations and Practical Modes of Presentation

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