2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.002
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Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation

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Cited by 418 publications
(252 citation statements)
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References 67 publications
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“…For instance, the innovation incentives of managers are motivated by a larger institutional ownership (Aghion et al, 2013), corporate venture capital (Chemmanur et al, 2014), private equity ownership (Lerner et al, 2011;Bernstein, 2015), greater tolerance for failure (Ederer and Manso, 2013;Tian and Wang, 2014), , lower analyst coverage (He and Tian, 2013) and higher promotion-based tournament prize for non-CEO executives (Jia et al, 2016). Meanwhile, employee incentive is also important in innovation activities, for example, non-executive employee stock options have a positive effect on firm innovation (Chang et al, 2015) while unionization impedes firm innovation (Bradley et al, 2016). Therefore, to maximize the utilization of both the management group and ordinary employees, firms need to establish proper incentive mechanisms to motivate them to engage in activities that promote innovation (Gupta et al, 2007).…”
Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…For instance, the innovation incentives of managers are motivated by a larger institutional ownership (Aghion et al, 2013), corporate venture capital (Chemmanur et al, 2014), private equity ownership (Lerner et al, 2011;Bernstein, 2015), greater tolerance for failure (Ederer and Manso, 2013;Tian and Wang, 2014), , lower analyst coverage (He and Tian, 2013) and higher promotion-based tournament prize for non-CEO executives (Jia et al, 2016). Meanwhile, employee incentive is also important in innovation activities, for example, non-executive employee stock options have a positive effect on firm innovation (Chang et al, 2015) while unionization impedes firm innovation (Bradley et al, 2016). Therefore, to maximize the utilization of both the management group and ordinary employees, firms need to establish proper incentive mechanisms to motivate them to engage in activities that promote innovation (Gupta et al, 2007).…”
Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Based on these two reasons, the human capital order of employees (including top executives) would be highly similar to that of ordinary employees to a large extent. 13 For robustness, we also interact the variables of interest (i.e. MPP, EPP and IPG) with the channel variable, HC, and the results are included in Table 10.…”
Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is a common treatment used in the literature to avoid the sample selection problem (see e.g.,Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012),and Chang, Fu, Low, and Zhang (2015)). If we exclude all observations with missing CEO and board characteristics, there will only be less than 9000 observations (i.e.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chang X, Fu K and Low A [15], Ayyagari M, Demirguc-Kunt A and Maksimovic V [16] and other scholars believe that these variables will have a significant impact on corporate R & D investment. The definition of all the variables is shown in Table 1.…”
Section: Research Model and Variable Descriptionmentioning
confidence: 98%