No abstract

We provide evidence that analyst coverage affects the pattern of security issuance. First, firms covered by fewer analysts are less likely to issue equity as opposed to debt. They issue equity less frequently, but when they do so, it is in larger amounts. Moreover, these firms depend more on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions. Although all firms issue larger amounts of equity after favorable stock returns, this tendency is more pronounced for less covered firms. Finally, debt ratios of firms followed by fewer analysts are more affected by Baker and Wurgler's (2002) external finance-weighted average market-to-book ratio than those of firms followed by more analysts. These results are consistent with market timing behavior in the presence of information asymmetry, as well as behavior implied by dynamic adverse selection models of equity issuance

We present a model and provide empirical evidence showing that auditor quality affects the financing decisions of companies, and that higher audit quality reduces the impact of market conditions on client financial decisions and capital structure. Consistent with our analytical predictions, we find that companies audited by Big 6 firms are more likely to issue equity as opposed to debt than are those audited by small audit firms. We also find that companies audited by Big 6 auditors are able to make larger equity issues than are those audited by small auditors, but the difference narrows when market conditions improve. Additional results show that the debt ratios of companies decrease less in response to favorable market conditions when auditor quality is high, at least over the medium term.

We find that stock liquidity increases stock price crash risk. To identify the causal effect, we use the decimalization of stock trading as an exogenous shock to liquidity. This effect is increasing in a firm’s ownership by transient investors and nonblockholders. Liquid firms have a higher likelihood of future bad earnings news releases, which are accompanied by greater selling by transient investors, but not blockholders. Our results suggest that liquidity induces managers to withhold bad news, fearing that its disclosure will lead to selling by transient investors. Eventually, accumulated bad news is released all at once, causing a crash.

We study how firms allocate cash flow by estimating the cash-flow sensitivities of various uses of cash flow. We decompose cash flow into a transitory and a permanent component and focus on the allocation of the transitory component, which by construction contains little information about future growth opportunities. We find that more financially constrained firms allocate more transitory cash flow to cash savings and direct less toward investment than do less constrained firms, consistent with constrained firms accumulating liquidity to buffer against future financial constraints. We also illustrate several methodological advantages of our approach over alternative methods in previous studies. (JEL G31, G32)