New Perspectives on Appeasement: Some Implications for International Relations

Richardson, James L.

doi:10.2307/2010215

Cited by 41 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…It is worth contemplating whether or not the appeasing side even has the capability to satiate the opposing party's demands in the first place. JL Richardson (1988) opines that "the fundamental reason for the failure of appeasement was that Hitler's goals lay far beyond the limits of reasonable accommodation that the appeasers were prepared to contemplate. "41 This was a problem with Hitler, whose demands are essentially too large to fulfill.…”

Section: 4mentioning

confidence: 99%

“Archipelagic Spratlys”: China’s Desperate Attempt to Preserve Expansionist Policy?

Bensurto¹

2022

Peaceful Maritime Engagement in East Asia and the Pacific Region

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L.Vuving wrote: "By clarifying the legal status of most of the South China Sea, the ruling goes a long way in shedding light as to which actions were lawful and unlawful."2 He concluded, In one stroke, a tribunal verdict has shifted the strategic landscape in the South China Sea. The ruling puts an end to the age of ambiguity that has characterized the game nations have been playing in the South China Sea for decades. It also creates the conditions for a more binary configuration of how states line up on the issue. Although the tribunal has no army to enforce its verdict, its decision has legitimacy. And those who directly benefit from the ruling will try their best to make it enforceable.3 On 12 July 2016, The Hague-based ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal that was constituted 3 years earlier in 2013 under Part xv and Annex vii of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) issued its ruling on the merits of the case The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines vs. The People's Republic of China).4The Tribunal invalidated China's claim for historic waters in its 9-dash line map.5 It likewise clarified the character of the relevant features in the Spratlys 1 The opinions expressed herein are the author's personal views and do not in any way represent the views of his Institution. 2 Alexander L. Vuving, Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies https:// thed iplo mat.com/ 2016/ 07/ why-the-south-china-sea-rul ing-is-a-game-chan ger/ . 3 Ibid. 4 The members of the Arbitral Tribunal were Judge Thomas A. Mensah (President), Judge Jean Pierre-Cot, Judge Stanislaw Pawlak, Prof. Alfred Soons, and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum. Details and materials on the case may be accessed at www.pca-cpa.org/ en/ cases/ 7/ .

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Section: 4mentioning

confidence: 99%

“Archipelagic Spratlys”: China’s Desperate Attempt to Preserve Expansionist Policy?

Bensurto¹

2022

Peaceful Maritime Engagement in East Asia and the Pacific Region

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“…Or was the efficient bargaining outcome unknowable in September 1938, because Hitler’s level of ambition both before and during the war was not so much private as it was unstable, an effect of the strategic interaction itself (Hilderbrand, 1976; Hillgruber, 1955; Rich, 1973–1974)? Or was there no price at which war could have been avoided—either through deterrence or concessions—because war itself was Hitler’s objective (Kennedy, 1987: 338; May, 1984: 540; Richardson, 1988: 67–68)?…”

Section: Market Analogies and The Levels-of-analysis Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Better than a bet: good reasons for behavioral and rational choice assumptions in IR theory

Davis

2022

European Journal of International Relations

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Behavioral IR is enjoying newfound popularity. Nonetheless, attempts to integrate behavioral research into the larger project of IR theory have proven controversial. Many scholars treat behavioral findings as a trove of plausible ad hoc modifications to rational choice models, thereby lending credence to arguments that behavioral IR is merely residual, empirical, and hence not theoretical. Others limit their research to cataloging outcomes consistent with the basic tenets of behavioral models. Although this expands the empirical base, it is insufficient for theoretical progress. In this article, I explore various answers to the question of when rational choice or behavioral assumptions should guide efforts to build IR theory. I argue that no single answer trumps all others. Examining the various conditions under which actors reason highlights the importance of macrofoundations. Macrofoundations condition the effects of microprocesses and help identify relevant scope conditions for both rational choice and behavioral models of decision-making. Examining the various purposes of IR theory also provides answers to the question of when rational or behavioral assumptions are likely to be most useful. Although many behavioral scholars premise the relevance of their findings on claims of empirical realism, I argue that under certain conditions, deductive theorizing on the basis of as-if behavioral assumptions can lead to powerful theories that improve our understanding of IR and may help decision-makers promote desired ends.

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“…35 'Whether or not appeasement was a 19th century tradition', J. L. Richardson notes, 'there is no doubt of the continuity of British policy toward Germany from shortly after 1919'. 36 The Versailles treaty had ended the war without creating peace. Appeasement was to succeed where the treaty had failed by modifying the Versailles settlement in ways that would satisfy Germany.…”

Section: From Versailles To Munichmentioning

confidence: 99%

The history of a lesson: Versailles, Munich and the social construction of the past

Rasmussen¹

2003

Rev. Int. Stud.

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The article investigates the concept of lessons in IR. By means of a constructivist critique of the ‘lessons literature’, the article analyses one of the most important of IR lessons: that of Munich. Examining how the Munich lesson came about, the article shows the praxeological nature of lessons and emphasises the need to study the history of lessons rather than the lessons of history. This approach shows that Munich is the end point of a constitutive history that begins in the failure of the Versailles treaty to create a durable European order following the First World War. The Munich lesson is thus one element of the lesson of Versailles, which is a praxeology that defines how the West is to make peace, and against whom peace must be defended. The lesson of Versailles has been, at least in part, constitutive of the outbreak of the Cold War, and it continues to define the Western conception of what defines peace and security even in the ‘war against terrorism’.

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New Perspectives on Appeasement: Some Implications for International Relations

Cited by 41 publications

References 21 publications

“Archipelagic Spratlys”: China’s Desperate Attempt to Preserve Expansionist Policy?

“Archipelagic Spratlys”: China’s Desperate Attempt to Preserve Expansionist Policy?

Better than a bet: good reasons for behavioral and rational choice assumptions in IR theory

The history of a lesson: Versailles, Munich and the social construction of the past

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