The history of a lesson: Versailles, Munich and the social construction of the past

Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby

doi:10.1017/s0260210503004996

Cited by 17 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Cox, 2014). For this reason, we need to look at the 'history of lessons' along with lessons of history (Rasmussen, 2003).…”

Section: Theoretical Background and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war

Forsberg

2018

European Politics and Society

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Russia's role in the international order is often explained with reference to historical examples, analogies and longue durée trends. This article examines Russia's role in, and visions of, the international order from the Congress of Vienna to the end of the Cold War. The article also discusses the lessons, and perhaps also the wrong lessons, that the current Russian leadership and elite have drawn on the basis of past grand bargains. It concludes that in the course of history, there has been more variation than continuity in Russia's policy towards the European security system and, moreover, that the post-Cold War security order in Europe was not imposed on Russia during the years immediately following the end of the Cold War.

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“…Cox, 2014). For this reason, we need to look at the 'history of lessons' along with lessons of history (Rasmussen, 2003).…”

Section: Theoretical Background and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war

Forsberg

2018

European Politics and Society

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“…For instance, how is it and perhaps more importantly, why is it that the Roman Empire, Napolean's military experiences and Britain in the 19th century can be utilized to meaningfully analyze the US role in the world in the 21st century? 15 Historical memory might be more central to theoretical predictions than otherwise assumed (Berger 1997;Rasmussen 2003). These are very much open questions, but examining the why involvedrather than relying on an epistemological assumption that they do until proven otherwisewill allow for a better understanding of what issues can be bracketed, and which cannot.…”

Section: The Question Of Alternative: Thinking Differently About Tempmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theory across time: the privileging of time-less theory in international relations

McIntosh

2015

Int. Theory

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How does the understanding of time and temporality in international relations (IR) shape the study of international politics? IR is centrally concerned with the study of issues such as armed conflict, but wars are events – a series of occurrences that only come into being through their relationship across time. The concept of time at work in the understanding of this event thus plays an inextricable role in the scholarship produced. IR shares an understanding of time that pervades (traditional) social science and is based on the Western notion of clock-time. This conception of time encourages a spatiotemporal model of the past that epistemologically privileges temporal understandings that value generalizable, time-invariant theory and discount temporal fluidity and context. These temporal commitments operate at a deep level, informing and shaping theory construction in important ways and de-emphasizing alternative approaches that may more accurately reflect the contingency of international events, discontinuities in political practice, and the radical shifts in international structures, which are often most in need of scholarly analysis. This article concludes that by treating temporality as a stand-alone issue, IR can better model and predict international political practices.

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“…Historically, this 'dreaded word' has been associated with Foreign Office policy towards, most notably, Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and during Serb aggression Bosnia in the 1990s (Meyer 2010: 216 and 249). Memories of these sorry episodes resonate in the collective diplomatic consciousness in the UK, as well as tapping into a wider Western meta-narrative back to the Versailles Treaty and the Munich Agreement which, the moral of the lesson has it (Rasmussen 2003), left dictators to rampage unchallenged, costing much 'blood and treasure' to rectify. Dealing with dictators sooner rather than later has become the ambition, although debates will continue to rage about when the international community is able to judge when a dictator has gone too far, and what lawful and legitimate action can remedy the situation.…”

Section: 'Though Shalt Not Appease'mentioning

confidence: 99%

Liberal intervention in the foreign policy thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron

Daddow

Schnapper

2013

Cambridge Review of International Affairs

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David Cameron was a critic of Tony Blair's doctrine of the international community, which was used to justify war in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq, suggesting caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. However, and in spite of making severe cuts to the defence budget, the Cameron-led Coalition government signed Britain up to a military intervention in Libya within a year of coming into office. What does this say about the place liberal interventionism occupies in contemporary British foreign policy? To answer this question, this article studies the nature of what we describe as the 'bounded liberal' tradition that has informed British foreign policy thinking since 1945, suggesting that it puts a distinctly UK national twist on conventional conservative thought about international affairs. Its components are: scepticism of grand schemes to remake the world; instinctive Atlanticism; security through collective endeavour; and anti-appeasement. We then compare and contrast the conditions for intervention set out by Tony Blair and David Cameron. We explain the similarities but crucially also the vital differences between the two leaders' thinking on intervention, with particular reference to Cameron's perception that Downing Street needed to loosen its control over foreign policy-making after Iraq. Our argument is that policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted Blair and Cameron to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture to British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years. This return to a patient, pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that military operations in Kosovo and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, yet came to be justified by similar arguments from the two leaders.

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The history of a lesson: Versailles, Munich and the social construction of the past

Cited by 17 publications

References 7 publications

Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war

Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war

Theory across time: the privileging of time-less theory in international relations

Liberal intervention in the foreign policy thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron

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