Better than a bet: good reasons for behavioral and rational choice assumptions in IR theory

Abstract

Behavioral IR is enjoying newfound popularity. Nonetheless, attempts to integrate behavioral research into the larger project of IR theory have proven controversial. Many scholars treat behavioral findings as a trove of plausible ad hoc modifications to rational choice models, thereby lending credence to arguments that behavioral IR is merely residual, empirical, and hence not theoretical. Others limit their research to cataloging outcomes consistent with the basic tenets of behavioral models. Although this expands the empirical base, it is insufficient for theoretical progress. In this article, I explore various answers to the question of when rational choice or behavioral assumptions should guide efforts to build IR theory. I argue that no single answer trumps all others. Examining the various conditions under which actors reason highlights the importance of macrofoundations. Macrofoundations condition the effects of microprocesses and help identify relevant scope conditions for both rational choice and behavioral models of decision-making. Examining the various purposes of IR theory also provides answers to the question of when rational or behavioral assumptions are likely to be most useful. Although many behavioral scholars premise the relevance of their findings on claims of empirical realism, I argue that under certain conditions, deductive theorizing on the basis of as-if behavioral assumptions can lead to powerful theories that improve our understanding of IR and may help decision-makers promote desired ends.