Neither episodic, nor destined to failure? The endurance of Hungarian populism after 2010

Radical right populist politics in Hungary: Reinventing the Magyars through sport

“…However, for Orbán, national identity often shifts to regional identity as a way of demarcating himself, the Hungarian nation and the wider region from the 'oppressive' European Union. Csehi (2019Csehi ( : 1016, based on an analysis of Orbán's speeches, observes that for Orbán 'the corrupt elite' was increasingly equated with 'European bureaucrats'. Consequently, the Prime Minister has been fostering a regional identity which shifted from calling on the people of Hungary, to Hungarians (Magyars), and then to 'Central Europeans'.…”

“…Consequently, the Prime Minister has been fostering a regional identity which shifted from calling on the people of Hungary, to Hungarians (Magyars), and then to 'Central Europeans'. Csehi (2019Csehi ( : 1017 argues that the 'constant reinterpretation of "the people" with newer and newer layers of identity was carried out to ensure stable, or even increased mobilization behind his political agenda'.…”

Post-Neoliberalism and External Financial Liberalization: Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism

“…Based on a rhetorical equivalence between resistance against Moscow-led communist apparatchiks and opposition to Brussels-led postcommunist politicians, Fidesz tried to establish itself as the heir of the long history of the fight for Hungarian independence, demonstrating this through the strengthening of political participation through national consultations, the protection of Hungarians living abroad and the recovery of national powers delegated to multilateral and regional institutions (Bozóki 2008;Fidesz 2010;Greskovits 2020;Pappas 2014). In line with right-wing populism, Fidesz focused its criticism on cosmopolitan political elites who favoured foreign interests by deploying neoliberal policies such as the de-nationalization of key sectors and public utilities, the fulfilment of multilateral rules, the removal of restrictions on foreign-currency indebtedness and the easing of immigration barriers (Csehi 2019;Enyedi 2016;Fidesz 2014). In light of this context, Fidesz pledges to defend a more restricted definition of people, rooted in natives who embrace Christian values and perform productive activities (Bluhm and Varga 2019;Enyedi 2016).…”

Negative and Engaged: Sentiments towards the 2016 Migrant Quota Referendum in Hungarian Online Media

“…The FIDeSZ government had not only started to shape the perception of immigrants well in advance, and prepare the Hungarian population for the subsequent referendum, but they also ensured that the decision could be framed as defending the Hungarian nation against immigration, and national sovereignty against the eU. as Robert Csehi notes, the referendum not only helped him [Orbán] pose as the true representative of the general will of "the people," but it also enabled him to take a more confrontational position in european-level negotiations on migration, 23 so while the aim of the referendum itself was communicated as questioning citizens on controversial issues of national importance, in fact it became a tool for enhancing the popularity of the government and its international standing. 24 This is problematic because the results of referendums are normally manifestations of the people's will.…”