Negotiating Flexibility: External Contracting and Working Time Control in German and Danish Telecommunications Firms

Abstract

This study examines how different participation rights and structures affect employee control over working time. The analysis is based on a comparison of matched call center and technician workplaces in two major telecommunications firms in Germany and Denmark. It draws on data from semi-structured interviews with managers, supervisors, and employee representatives between 2010 and 2016. Unions and works councils in both firms agreed to a series of concessions on working time policies in the early 2010s in exchange for agreements to halt or reverse outsourcing. The authors use Lukes' concepts of decision-making and agenda-setting power to explain these common trends, as well as later divergence in outcomes. Germany's stronger formal co-determination rights over working time proved a critical power resource for employee representatives as they sought to re-establish employee control in new, more flexible working time models.

Union Strategies, National Institutions and the Use of Temporary Labour in Italian and US Plants

“…One approach is for unions and their representatives to negotiate concessions reducing internal labour costs relative to external flexible groups. Doellgast and Berg (), for instance, illustrate how unions have responded to the widespread use of strategic benchmarking by employers, particularly in contracting relationships across different organizations, with concessions aimed at mirroring the flexibility provided by externalized labour. Concessions can apply to working conditions and pay, as well as to organizational flexibility (Eichhorst ; Pulignano and Keune 2015).…”

Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Challenge of External Work Arrangements for Industrial Manufacturing Unions in Germany and Italy

“…Therefore, a similar exchange could have taken place also to regulate subcontracting (see, e.g. Doellgast and Berg, 2017;Hertwig et al, 2018).…”

“…Indeed, even though unions have slightly stronger bargaining rights concerning agency work, they have relied on their institutionalised bargaining rights in other domains – especially working time and mobilisation to bargain regulation. Therefore, a similar exchange could have taken place also to regulate subcontracting (see, for example, Doellgast and Berg, 2017; Hertwig et al, 2019).…”

Institutions as constraints and resources: Explaining cross‐national divergence in performance management

“…They also may include negotiated or legal restrictions on certain monitoring practices. According to power resources theory, these constraints will be strengthened where unions and workers enjoy countervailing power to limit managerial discretion via stronger organisational capacity (Pulignano, Doerflinger, & De Franceschi, ), labour market power (Fligstein & Byrkjeflot, ), and/or participation rights (Doellgast & Berg, ). They are often influenced by strong employment protection legislation (EPL), such as provisions placing strict limits on valid reasons for dismissal (OECD, ).…”