Union Strategies, National Institutions and the Use of Temporary Labour in Italian and US Plants

Abstract

This article analyses variation in the use of temporary labour based on a comparison of two plants of the same US automotive multinational corporation, one in Italy and the other in the United States. We argue that differences in the use of temporary labour are explained by union capacities to make trade‐offs between alternative forms of flexibility as well as trade‐offs in the protection of internal and external groups of workers. Union capacity is dependent on the availability of power resources within different national institutional environments. These resources are shown to influence not only the ways in which temporary workers are used but also bargaining outcomes — including employment conditions — benefiting them.

Dualisierung und Solidarität in Europas Arbeitswelt: Eine Hierarchische Perspektive

“…In particular, previous studies show that factors shaping trade union strategies include the capacities of labor market institutions, such as membership numbers, the centralization of bargaining, involvement in labor market policy, and organizational structures (Davidsson/Emmenegger 2013; Gordon 2015; Oliver 2011), as well as trade unions' historical identities and ideologies (Benassi/Vlandas 2016; Dorigatti 2017; Marino 2012; Pulignano/Doerflinger 2013). Studying strategies' impact, previous work often points out the ability to draw upon institutional power resources and associational capacities to coordinate and organize workers Benassi et al 2019;Doellgast et al 2009;Pulignano/Signoretti 2016;Wagner/Refslund 2016). In addition, sectoral characteristics are also shown to influence the form, levels, and approaches of organizations (Carré et al 2010;Geppert et al 2014).…”

Explaining job insecurity for temporary agency workers: A comparison between Sweden and Belgium

“…This is relevant if we want to understand how security via the union channel is guaranteed to agency workers, since at national level, the unions could have influence on the regulation, while at the local level, works councils and trade unions may adopt different strategies in dealing with temporary agency workers. These strategies are often the response to the corporate strategy of using temporary agency work (Pulignano and Signoretti, 2016) either as a buffer in case of a downturn or for extensive long-term use (Elcioglu, 2010; Kalleberg and Marsden, 2005; Purcell et al, 2004). Holst et al (2010) also discern a new way of using agency workers, whereby assignments have no fixed termination date.…”

Negotiating Flexibility: External Contracting and Working Time Control in German and Danish Telecommunications Firms

“…Employee representatives are asked to agree to greater working time flexibility to secure jobs and to prevent outsourcing, often termed flexibility–security trade-offs (Ibsen 2011; Pulignano and Keune 2014; Pulignano et al 2016). Researchers have documented concessions in areas such as mandatory overtime, increased disciplinary sanctions for absences (Pulignano and Signoretti 2016), and agreements to work unsocial working hours (i.e., late nights and weekends) (Doellgast 2012) in exchange for internalizing work or halting plans to externalize jobs to subcontractors or staffing agencies.…”