Negative expertise in conditions of manufactured ignorance: epistemic strategies, virtues and skills

Abstract

This paper is motivated by the need to respond to the spread of influential misinformation and manufactured ignorance, which places pressure on the work of experts in various sectors. To meet this need, the paper discusses the conditions required for expert testimony to evolve a reconceptualisation of negative capability as a new form of epistemic humility. In this regard, professional knowledge formation is not considered to be separate from the institutional and social processes and values that uphold its production. Drawing attention to the structural and relational aspects of ignorance, as opposed to the individualistic and internal aspects, we rely on the sociology of knowledge, the social epistemologies and the feminist epistemologies that have played a fundamental role in the development of the investigation of ignorance. First, we analyse the criteria for epistemic humility based on prior theoretical discussions concerning negative knowledge as a form of reflective practice. Then, we seek to determine what kinds of strategies, virtues and skills experts need to have so as to 'manage ignorance' in socially complex situations. Finally, we suggest the reformulation of negative expertise as a phronetic skill for navigating through situations of ignorance and uncertainty in an epistemically and socially responsible manner.

Frictional rhythms of climate work in city governance

“…In so doing, climate specialists cultivate a capacity for what Lorraine Code (2006) has called ‘ecological thinking’. They display a sensitivity for differences of epistemic locations, an attunement to and responsibility for one’s own epistemic limits and those of others (Parviainen & Lahikainen, 2021). Still, for our interviewees, this means taking in their stride the constant ‘jumping back to square one’ and bearing the brunt of the dysrhythmias and arrhythmias of their work and of life outside it.…”

Learning from errors in digital patient communication: professionals’ enactment of negative knowledge and digital ignorance in the workplace

“…This has been found to be central for driving efforts to improve erroneous practices (Bauer and Mulder, 2007b; Jonasson, 2015; Leicher and Mulder, 2016). The development of negative knowledge and ignorance is assumed to be based on, and further promote, in-depth reflective processes (Gross and McGoey, 2015; Oser et al , 2012), which is important because reflection is considered an essential component of the development of professional competences (Parviainen and Lahikainen, 2021).…”

“…In this regard, the concept of negative knowledge has been introduced (Gartmeier et al , 2008; Oser and Spychiger, 2005; Parviainen and Eriksson, 2006). Negative knowledge is conceptualized as experiential knowledge about, for example, “what not to do” and “what is not (yet) known.” Primarily, the latter form has been related to epistemological understandings of ignorance and the awareness of such ignorance to develop one’s skills (Gross and McGoey, 2015; Parviainen and Lahikainen, 2021). In the present study, awareness of own ignorance in digitalization could thus be important for identifying the needs for new knowledge.…”

Ecosocial Philosophy of Education: Ecologizing the Opinionated Self

“…Humility in the original sense of the word means being of the earth, the humus, the soil, the ground, but this meaning does not connote poor self-esteem, self-worth, or submissiveness, but a realistic attunement with the world without identification to a narrow idea of self or self-interest (see Waks 2018). Humility can be understood as the foundation of all virtue (St. Augustinus, according to Waks 2018) as virtuous action requires a robust sense of reality and self-reflection (Parviainen and Lahikainen 2019).…”

“…To summarize the preceding discussion, we take epistemological humility here in two senses. First, in the sense that even the best and surest knowledge can be inadequate in the complexity of the more-than-human world (Abram 1997) and that we must therefore do our best to avoid epistemological arrogance in regard to known unknowns and unknown unknowns (Parviainen and Lahikainen 2019). Second, we take it in the sense that questions of knowledge are not (always) the most important questions and we should see such questions as embedded in a broader ecology of questions about response-ability and care (Oliver 2004;Noddings 1986).…”