Need vs. Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets

Hassidim, Avinatan; Romm, Assaf; Shorrer, Ran I.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3071873

Cited by 12 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…Consequently, residency and fellowship programs conduct many interviews. Unlike the market for new economists, there is no central national meeting at which a large proportion (Roth 1991a), as does a recently organized match for psychologists in Israel (Hassidim, Romm, and Shorrer 2017a). A newly organized medical match in Israel (in which hospitals are passive) has a very different organization (Bronfman et al 2015).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design

Roth

2018

American Economic Review

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design

Roth

2018

American Economic Review

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“…A college admission problem with stipends of Hassidim et al (2017), consists of set of colleges C, a set of students S, a finite set of contract terms T ⊆ N, where each t ∈ T correspond to a funding level, a set of contracts X ⊆ C × S × T and preferences ( i ) i∈C∪S for colleges and students. Preferences of a student s are over X s ∪ {∅} and monotone with respect to >.…”

Section: College Admission With Stipendmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a choice function from the class defined by Hassidim et al (2017), the virtual choice function can be defined as follows: The choice Ch c (Y ) of college c from Y ⊆ X c is constructed iteratively. Consider the student s who is ranked top according to ≫ c in Y S and choose the contract with the smallest stipend with i in Y that does not make the choice violate the quota.…”

Section: College Admission With Stipendsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Observe that, in the language of Hassidim et al (2017), the virtual choice function prioritizes merit over need in college admission. This highlights the fundamental trade-off in Hassidim et al (2017): if stability and (group)-strategy-proofness are required the mechanism behaves necessarily, by our equivalence result, like a mechanisms that assigns seats based on merit only (as encoded in the master list) and keeps stipends as low as possible independently of the applicant.…”

Section: College Admission With Stipendsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms

Schlegel

2018

SSRN Journal

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We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism.Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result for choice functions under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds. JEL-classification: C78, D47

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“…The set of stable matchings in a real-world market is large (Hassidim, Romm, and Shorrer 2017). Still, the Gale-Shapley algorithm yields one that is most preferred by the one side and least preferred by the other (McVitie and Wilson 1971).…”

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confidence: 99%

Fair Procedures for Fair Stable Marriage Outcomes

Tziavelis

Giannakopoulos

Johansen

et al. 2020

AAAI

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Given a two-sided market where each agent ranks those on the other side by preference, the stable marriage problem calls for finding a perfect matching such that no pair of agents prefer each other to their matches. Recent studies show that the number of stable solutions can be large in practice. Yet the classical solution to the problem, the Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm, assigns an optimal match to each agent on one side, and a pessimal one to each on the other side; such a solution may fare well in terms of equity only in highly asymmetric markets. Finding a stable matching that minimizes the sex equality cost, an equity measure expressing the discrepancy of mean happiness among the two sides, is strongly NP-hard. Extant heuristics either (a) oblige some agents to involuntarily abandon their matches, or (b) bias the outcome in favor of some agents, or (c) need high-polynomial or unbounded time.We provide the first procedurally fair algorithms that output equitable stable marriages and are guaranteed to terminate in at most cubic time; the key to this breakthrough is the monitoring of a monotonic state function and the use of a selective criterion for accepting proposals. Our experiments with diverse simulated markets show that: (a) extant heuristics fail to yield high equity; (b) the best solution found by the GS algorithm can be very far from optimal equity; and (c) our procedures stand out in both efficiency and equity, even when compared to a non-procedurally fair approximation scheme.

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Need vs. Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets

Cited by 12 publications

References 58 publications

Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design

Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design

Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms

Fair Procedures for Fair Stable Marriage Outcomes

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