We use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments concerning three extensive form games with similar perfect equilibria. In only two of the games does observed behavior approach the perfect equilibrium as players gain experience. We examine a family of learning models which possess some of the robust properties of learning noted in the psychology literature. The intermediate term predictions of these models track well the observed behavior in all three games, even though the models considered differ in their very long term predictions. We argue that for predicting observed behavior the intermediate term predictions of dynamic learning models may be even more important than their asymptotic properties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C92.

The organization of the labor market for medical interns and residents underwent a number of changes before taking its present form in 1951. The record of these changes and the problems that prompted them provides an unusual opportunity to study the forces at work in markets of this kind. The present paper begins with a brief history and then presents a game-theoretic analysis to explain the orderly operation and longevity of the current market, in contrast to the turmoil that characterized various earlier short-lived attempts to organize the market. An analysis is also given of some contemporary problems facing the market. A subsidiary theme of the paper concerns the history of ideas: the problems encountered in the organization of this market, and some of the solutions arrived at, anticipated the discussion of such issues in the literature of economics and game theory.

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Vnivfrsilv aj tlliiidi.s riiis paper considers somi: jiamc-lhcorclic aspects of malching pmblcnis and pruci-'duics. of the sorl wliich involve matching Ihe members of one group of agents wiih one or more members of a second, disjoinl group (>f agents, all of whom have preferences over the possible resulting matches. The main foeiis of [his paper is mi determining lhe e,\lenl lo which maiching procedures ean be designed whicli give agents the ineenlive to honeslK reveal thenpreferences, und which produce stable matches. Two principal results are demonstrated. The first is that no matching procedure exisis which always yields a stable outcome and gives players the inccniive lo reveal their true preferences, even though procedures exist whieh accomplish either of these goals separateK, lhe second resuit is that matching proeedures d(* exist, however, wliich always \iekl d stable outcome and which always give all the agents in one of the two disjoint sels uf agents the incenti\e to reveal their true preferences, 1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is to explore the underlying economic structure common to matching problems and procedures. By malching problems. I refer to any of the pervasive class of problems which involve matching the members of one group of agents with one or more members of a second, disjoint group of agents, all of whom have preferences over the possible resulting matches. Thus the problems arising from the need to match, e.g.. students with educational institutions, athietcs with teams, adoptive children with adoptive parents, men with women (in marriage, mixed doubles, or computer dating), civil servants with civil service positions, and authors (via their papers) with scholarly journals, are all. in many of their most important aspects, matching problems.' By malching procedures. 1 refer to the institutional arrangements by which the matching is accomplished. These institutional arrangements may range from completely deeentralized procedures, in which agents negotiate directly with one another (as in marriage in contemporary Western societies), all the way to completely centralized procedures, in which all agents state their preferences for possible matches, which "