Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growths

Ding, Ning; Field, Barry C.

doi:10.3368/le.81.4.496

Cited by 153 publications

(82 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…The outcome is distorted economic and resource management policies that favor the rent seekers and generate problems of corruption, institutional breakdown and rapid dissipation of resource rents through over-exploitation. 5 Certain types of natural resource endowments 1 For examples of these findings, see Barbier (2005), Bulte et al (2005), Ding and Field (2005), Dietz et al (2007), Isham et al (2005), Mehlum et al (2006), Neumayer (2004), Rodríguez and Sachs (1999), Sachs and Warner (1997) and Sachs and Warner (2001). However, for empirical evidence refuting the "resource curse" see Brunnschweiler (2008) and Brunnschwiler and Bulte (2008).…”

mentioning

confidence: 89%

Corruption and the Political Economy of Resource-Based Development: A Comparison of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

Barbier

2010

Environ Resource Econ

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confidence: 89%

Corruption and the Political Economy of Resource-Based Development: A Comparison of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

Barbier

2010

Environ Resource Econ

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“…Despite the popularity of the curse of natural resources hypothesis, others have reported findings that are at variance with this view (e.g. see Brunnschweiler 2008;Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008;Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 2010;Ding and Field 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural Resource Revenues and Public Investment in Resource‐rich Economies in Sub‐Saharan Africa

Karimu

Adu

Marbuah

et al. 2017

Review Development Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Typescript prepared by Ayesha Chari. Terms of use: Documents inThe United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research provides economic analysis and policy advice with the aim of promoting sustainable and equitable development. The Institute began operations in 1985 in Helsinki, Finland, as the first research and training centre of the United Nations University. Today it is a unique blend of think tank, research institute, and UN agency-providing a range of services from policy advice to governments as well as freely available original research.The Institute is funded through income from an endowment fund with additional contributions to its work programme from Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, FinlandThe views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or the United Nations University, nor the programme/project donors. Abstract:The general policy prescription for resource-rich countries is that, for sustainable consumption, a greater percentage of the windfall from resource rents should be channelled into accumulating foreign assets such as a sovereign public fund as done in Norway and other developed but resource-rich countries. This might not be a correct policy prescription for resource-rich sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, where public capital is very low to support the needed economic growth. In such countries, rents from resources serve as opportunity to scale-up the needed public capital. Using panel data for the period 1990-2013, we find in line with the scaling-up hypothesis that resource rents significantly increase public investment in SSA and that this tends to depend on the quality of political institutions. We also find evidence of a positive effect of public investment on economic growth, which also depends on the level of resource rents. Using some of the components of public investment, such as health and education expenditure, we find a negative effect of resource rents, suggesting among other things that public spending of resource rents is directed more to other infrastructure investments.

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“…Researchers often employ cross-sectional data to investigate the long-term effect of natural resources on growth Leite and Weidmann, 1999;Tella and Ades, 1999;Lederman and Maloney, 2003;Boschini et al, 2007;Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2013;Ding and Field, 2005;Mehlum et al, 2006;Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2007). van der Ploeg (2011) notes that the application of cross-sectional data in growth regressions suffers from omitted variable bias because of the correlation between initial income and the omitted initial level of productivity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%