Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt

Diamond, Douglas W.

doi:10.1086/261775

Cited by 2,665 publications

(1,755 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Ou seja, à medida que as empresas elevam seus níveis de endividamento, reduzem os níveis de accruals, o que seria decorrente de uma tentativa de reduzir custos de financiamento (Diamond, 1991;Billett, King e Mauer, 2007). Porém, a partir de certo nível de endividamento, devido às cláusulas de covenants, os ganhos advindos da redução de custos da dívida seriam mitigados pelos riscos de não cumprir as cláusulas, surgindo incentivos ao aumento dos accruals (Sweeney, 1994;DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994;Sun & Rath, 2008).…”

Section: Implicações Práticasunclassified

Endividamento e decisões contábeis: a relação não linear entre dívida e qualidade dos lucros

Costa

Matte

Monte-mor

2018

Rev. contab. organ.

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1Os contratos de dívidas das empresas podem gerar diferentes incentivos para os gestores praticarem o chamado gerenciamento de resultados. De acordo com a maioria dos estudos presentes na literatura, empresas buscariam reduzir os accruals discricionários para reduzir assimetria de informação e incorrer em menores custos de financiamento. Outros estudos, porém, apontam que empresas com níveis muito elevados de endividamento podem fazer o contrário, aumentando os accruals discricionários para não incorrer em cláusulas restritivas (covenants). Considerando essas duas teorias, este artigo propõe uma relação não linear entre dívida e o componente discricionário dos lucros para as empresas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA entre 2008 e 2015. As evidências indicam uma relação positiva entre baixos níveis de dívida e a qualidade dos lucros, mas negativa para níveis maiores de dívida. Esse resultado sugere que em níveis elevados de endividamento, é preferível diminuir a qualidade dos lucros a incorrer em perdas por violações contratuais. Análises adicionais indicam que a relação não linear encontrada está relacionada à dívida de longo prazo, e não à de curto prazo. INTRODUÇÃOOs contratos de dívida, além de gerarem informações que auxiliam na avaliação de decisões operacionais, servem como mecanismo de disciplina de gestores (Harris & Raviv, 1990). Em particular, os covenants presentes nos contratos de dívida têm potencial para limitar o engajamento do gestor em atividades de maior risco (Leland, 1994).

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Section: Implicações Práticasunclassified

Endividamento e decisões contábeis: a relação não linear entre dívida e qualidade dos lucros

Costa

Matte

Monte-mor

2018

Rev. contab. organ.

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“…Informationally opaque firms are likely to rely on bank loans for a portion of their sources of financing in order to benefit from the monitoring activities of the bank lender, as well as to obtain potential signaling advantages associated with loan approvals. 13 Diamond (1991) shows that borrowers tend to move from private resources to the public debt market when the quality of the firm's information improves. Pennachi (1988) demonstrates that when the benefits of sellers' monitoring of the loan become negligible, a loan can be sold in its entirety.…”

Section: The Impact Of Earnings Information For Randd Intensive Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Information Content of Quarterly Earnings in Syndicated Bank Loan Prices

Allen¹,

Guo²,

Weintrop³

2008

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics

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We examine the information content of quarterly earnings announcements in the syndicated bank loan market, a hybrid public/private debt market that is exclusively comprised of informed institutional participants. In contrast to the literature on equity price reactions to earnings announcements, we find that bank loan returns experience no significant response on earnings announcement dates. However, we do find significant price movements in the secondary loan market four weeks prior to earnings announcement dates, around the time of the monthly covenant reports to members of the syndicate. Moreover, we find that the information content in syndicated bank loan prices is most pronounced for borrowers with predominantly intangible assets that experience declining earnings. Thus, we find evidence that when earnings announcements convey relevant information about the borrowing firm (i.e., for informationally opaque firms with declining creditworthiness), the syndicated bank loan market expeditiously incorporates that information into prices. JEL Classifications: G14, M41

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“…Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, Berglöf and von Thadden 1994, Winton 1995, Park 2000 neither studies the role of concentration in different classes of debt, nor the role of investor protection 20 ; at the same time, existing work on debt structure (e.g. Diamond 1991Diamond , 1993Rajan 1992;von Thadden 1995) studies the choice between bank and arm's length finance, not their coexistence.…”

Section: Exogenous Coalition Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Existing analyses of bank and arm's lenght debt [e.g. Diamond (1991Diamond ( , 1993 and Rajan (1992)] either study the choice between the two as opposed to their optimal mix in an optimal debt structure, or assume that investors are ex ante different, or both. direct evidence on this prediction of our model by using the data collected by Djankov et al (2008a and2008b) on debt enforcement and investor protection around the world.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contractual Resolutions of Financial Distress

Gennaioli

Rossi

2009

SSRN Journal

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In a financial contracting model we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. We show that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist − one class fully concentrated and with control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights − removes the controlling creditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and the performance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entire business as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. More broadly, our theory predicts that the efficiency of contractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.JEL classification: G33, K22.

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Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt

Cited by 2,665 publications

References 7 publications

Endividamento e decisões contábeis: a relação não linear entre dívida e qualidade dos lucros

Endividamento e decisões contábeis: a relação não linear entre dívida e qualidade dos lucros

The Information Content of Quarterly Earnings in Syndicated Bank Loan Prices

Contractual Resolutions of Financial Distress

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