We study the role of domestic financial institutions in sustaining capital flows to the private and public sector of a country whose government can default on its debt. As in recent public debt crises, in our model public defaults weaken banks' balance sheets, disrupting domestic financial markets. This effect leads to a novel complementarity between private capital inflows and public borrowing, where the former sustain the latter by boosting the government's cost of default. Our key message is that, by shaping the direction of private capital flows, financial institutions determine whether financial integration improves or reduces government discipline. We explore the implications of this complementarity for financial liberalization and debt-financed bailouts of banks. We present some evidence consistent with complementarity.JEL classification: F34, F36, G15, H63.
While we associate the U.K. with a high level of investor protection, this was not the case in the first half of the twentieth century-U.K. capital markets were marked by an absence of investor protection and few common law rights for minorities. Notwithstanding this, securities markets flourished. There were a large number of listed firms, companies issued substantial amounts of equity and inside ownership diminished rapidly. Much of the equity issuance arose from share exchanges in mergers and acquisitions and these in turn were the main cause of dilution of inside ownership. They relied on informal relations of trust between directors and shareholders. When formal regulation (both statutory and self-regulation) was introduced in the second half of the century, it had no effect on equity issuance or dispersion. Instead, it was associated with a much higher level of trading of shares as reflected in membership of controlling coalitions of shareholders and in the emergence of a market for corporate control. These results cast doubt on the law and finance explanation of the development of financial markets and suggest that growth of equity and dispersion of ownership in the U.K. relied more on informal relations of trust than on formal systems of regulation.
We study the role of domestic financial institutions in sustaining capital flows to the private and public sector of a country whose government can default on its debt. As in recent public debt crises, in our model public defaults weaken banks' balance sheets, disrupting domestic financial markets. This effect leads to a novel complementarity between private capital inflows and public borrowing, where the former sustain the latter by boosting the government's cost of default. Our key message is that, by shaping the direction of private capital flows, financial institutions determine whether financial integration improves or reduces government discipline. We explore the implications of this complementarity for financial liberalization and debt-financed bailouts of banks. We present some evidence consistent with complementarity.JEL classification: F34, F36, G15, H63.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.