2003
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.395020
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Cross-Country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions

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Cited by 203 publications
(251 citation statements)
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“…The effects of cultural and institutional proximity have also been taken up in M&A studies, but this concerns primarily international M&A deals across countries (Chapman, 2003). International acquisitions are influenced by differences in the institutional and cultural national frameworks, financial and exchange rates conditions, and prospects of entry in new foreign markets (Rossi and Volpin, 2004;Ragozzino, 2009;Di Guardo et al, 2013). Our paper focuses on domestic M&A instead, in order to assess the role of proximities within a more homogeneous national context.…”
Section: Symmetric and Asymmetric Proximities In Mandamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The effects of cultural and institutional proximity have also been taken up in M&A studies, but this concerns primarily international M&A deals across countries (Chapman, 2003). International acquisitions are influenced by differences in the institutional and cultural national frameworks, financial and exchange rates conditions, and prospects of entry in new foreign markets (Rossi and Volpin, 2004;Ragozzino, 2009;Di Guardo et al, 2013). Our paper focuses on domestic M&A instead, in order to assess the role of proximities within a more homogeneous national context.…”
Section: Symmetric and Asymmetric Proximities In Mandamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a transaction-specific control variable, RELATIVE SIZE between bidder and target (Moeller et al 2004;Seth 1990) is defined as the index of bidder sales to target sales and deal value to market capitalization as a percentage. Other binary control dummy variables include (1) PUBLIC, for listed target companies (Chang 1998, Officer 2007; (2) CASH, for purchase price payments in cash (Faccio and Masulis 2005;Travlos 1987); (3) HOSTILE, for transactions with a hostile attitude (Franks and Mayer 1996;Loughran and Vijh 1997); (4) TOEHOLD, for previous minority shareholdings (Betton et al 2009;Franks and Harris 1989); (5) CROSSBORDER, for foreign targets (Goergen and Renneboog 2004;Rossi and Volpin 2004); and (f) CONGLOMERATE, for conglomerate acquisition direction (Healy et al 1992;Morck et al 1990). Regarding the latter control variable, CONGLOMERATE, it is important to highlight that this information is used in order to filter out the effect on each single transaction.…”
Section: Additional Control Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To capture the practical barriers, the S&P Emerging Markets database defines small and illiquid stocks as noninvestible. 7 It then creates a variable called the "degree open factor" or "investible weight," which ranges from 6 Some other studies also show that governance environments and monitoring ability play an important role in determining cross-border acquisitions and fixed investments (Rossi and Volpin (2004), Kelley and Woidtke (2006)), as well as international investment allocation (Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003), Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005), and Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009)). 7 These criteria vary at the discretion of S&P's Index Committee.…”
Section: A Descriptions Of the Sample Of Emerging Market Firmsmentioning
confidence: 99%