Moderation without Change: The Strategic Transformation of Sinn Féin and the IRA in Northern Ireland

Abstract

This article examines how violent separatist groups moderate. Using the case of Sinn Féin and the IRA in Northern Ireland, it shows that moderation is a multidimensional process, entailing a change in strategic behaviour but not necessarily in the goals or values of a separatist group. For Irish republicans, moderation entailed giving up violent revolution and embracing peaceful reformism, but it did not require changing long-term goals, accepting the legitimacy of British rule in Northern Ireland, or distancing themselves from their history of armed struggle. Moderation was possible because both Irish republicans and the British state distinguished between republicans’ strategic behaviour and their political goals, with the British state neither expecting nor demanding a change in the goals of republicanism, and republicans showing a willingness to change tactics to bring them closer to their long-term goal of a united Ireland. This finding has important implications for the moderation of other radical separatist groups.

Electoral Performance by Post-Rebel Parties

“…With so many disparate post-rebel parties consistently participating in elections, what do we know about their electoral performance? Scholars have begun to examine these parties’ electoral fortunes and the implications for lasting peace and democratic outcomes (Allison 2006, 2010; Dresden 2015; Ishiyama and Marshall 2015; Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013, 2017; Manning 2008; Manning and Smith 2016; Marshall 2017; Matanock 2018; Ogura 2011; Sindre 2016a, 2016b, 2018; Sindre and Soderstrom 2016; Soderberg Kovacs and Hatz, 2016; Sprenkels 2018; M. Whiting 2016; S. Whiting 2016; and the contributions to this special issue). However, very few comparative studies have investigated the correlates of these parties’ electoral performance systematically over an extended period of time, particularly in a larger-N comparative context (these include, to our knowledge, Dresden 2015; Ishiyama and Widmeier 2017; Manning and Smith 2016).…”

Ambivalent Moderation: The FMLN’s Ideological Accommodation to Post-War Politics in El Salvador

“…Post-insurgent contexts thus present three possible constraints for moderation: continued resonance of wartime ideology, intra-movement ideological tensions and contextual or structural discouragement of moderation. Leaders will have to navigate such constraints – for example, by using moderation temporarily and strategically – but without modifying ultimate goals (Sindre 2018: 25; Whiting 2018), and possibly ‘misrepresent[ing] their adherence to liberalism to appeal to international and domestic audiences’ (Peceny and Stanley 2001: 177). On the other hand, leaders might also employ radical discourse strategically, for example to appease certain factions.…”

The HDP, the AKP and the Battle for Turkish Democracy

“…From its outset, the HDP was an elections-focused party. For many radical parties, being election-focused enforces a degree of moderation as parties are forced to work through the existing system (Whiting, 2018). However, interestingly the HDP managed to retain a high degree of radicalism relative to other parties competing in the system while still performing well in elections.…”