This article explores the factors affecting post-rebel party electoral performance. We present new research tracking the participation of these groups in national legislative elections from 1990 to 2016. Our full data set covers 77 parties and 286 elections in 37 countries. It includes parties formed after conflicts of varying length and intensity, with different incompatibilities, in every region of the world, and in countries with disparate political histories. Our analysis suggests that post-rebel parties’ early electoral performance strongly affects future performance, and that competition – crowd-out by older rival parties – and pre-war organizational experience in politics have a significant positive effect, particularly for those parties that are consistently winning more than about 10 per cent of seats. But especially for parties that consistently win very low seat shares, organizational characteristics yield increasingly to environmental factors, most importantly the presence of rival parties and the barriers to representation presented by electoral rules.

Under what conditions are rebel groups successfully incorporated into democratic politics when civil war ends? Using an original cross-national, longitudinal dataset, we examine political party formation by armed opposition groups over a 20-year period, from 1990 to 2009. We find that former armed opposition groups form parties in more than half of our observations. A rebel group's pre-war political experience, characteristics of the war and how it ended outweigh factors such as the country's political and economic traits and history. We advance a theoretical framework based on rebel leaders' expectations of success in post-war politics, and we argue that high rates of party formation by former armed opposition groups are likely a reflection of democratic weakness rather than democratic robustness in countries emerging from conflict.

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Despite the frequent occurrence of election boycotts, there are few studies available in the scholarly literature concerning their effectiveness, particularly as a strategy of opposition parties seeking to bring about the end of electoral authoritarian governments. This article uses an original data set with global coverage of hybrid regimes from 1981 to 2006, and uses event-history analysis to determine the efficacy of boycotts in national elections among other risk factors thought to undermine hybrid regimes. This article also takes a preliminary look at democratization outcomes following boycotted and contested elections in hybrid regimes. The core findings are that boycotts hasten the electoral defeat of hybrid regimes without much risk of destabilizing the electoral process, but ultimately do not lead to increased competition in successor regimes.

The Post-Rebel Electoral Parties (PREP) dataset offers an important new tool to study the transformation of rebel groups into political parties. It provides longitudinal data on the electoral participation and performance in national elections of political parties formed by armed opposition groups after civil war. Post-rebel electoral parties sit at the center of overlapping research agendas that address how best to build durable peace, and how to build resilient political systems and capable states after devastating conflict. A better understanding of how and why these parties participate and perform in elections over time is critical to any assessment of liberal peacebuilding. These parties – their strategic choices, organizational development, and impact on the political systems in which they participate – are also relevant to the broader study of comparative democratization, political parties, and party systems. Our dataset follows these parties forward through up to three decades of participation in postwar electoral politics. The current version of the data consists of 78 distinct parties derived from 56 conflict actors. The data cover 322 legislative election years and 216 executive elections in 39 countries over 30 years (1990–2021). This article describes the data and articulates the need for and motivation behind the dataset. We then illustrate the relevance of the data by testing the impact of rebel participation on the long-term peace.