The HDP, the AKP and the Battle for Turkish Democracy

Kaya, Zeynep; Whiting, Matthew

doi:10.1080/17449057.2018.1525168

Cited by 31 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 24 publications

(10 reference statements)

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“…The analysis uncovers a reduction in the use of public investment as a tool to strategically punish constituencies voting for the pro-Kurdish BDP. While data to analyse allocation patterns for the post-2014 period is not available yet, we have reason to believe that the preferential targeting of Kurdish areas was temporary and may have significantly reduced since the collapse of the 'democratic opening' between the AKP and Kurdish groups in 2015 (Kaya & Whiting, 2019), and the rise of Turkey's fully-fledged electoral authoritarianism. Indeed, since mid-2015 the AK Party has attempted to maintain its electoral dominance by shifting towards a nationalistic electoral strategy, which included presenting Kurdish nationalism as a security risk and developing an alliance with the ultra-nationalist MHP.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In contrast to Aytac (2014), who identifies as close challengers right-wing parties such as the MHP, we however suggest that during the late 2000s -i.e. the phase during which the AKP worked on eliminating checks on executive power (Kaya & Whiting, 2019) -incumbents tried to target Kurdish provinces, which had traditionally been a strong electoral basin for the government (Aktürk, 2011).…”

Section: Building Electoral Consensus By Expanding the Territorial DImentioning

confidence: 99%

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Building consensus: shifting strategies in the territorial targeting of Turkey's public transport investment

Luca

Rodríguez‐Pose

2019

Regional Studies

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A growing amount of research explores how the allocation of regional development monies follows electoral reasons. Yet, the existing literature on distributive politics provides different and contrasting expectations on which geographical areas will be targeted. We focus on proportional representation (PR) systems. While in such settings governments have incentives to target core districts and punish foes', we suggest that when incumbents attempt to build a state-party image they may broaden the territorial allocation of benefits and even target opposition out-groups. We exploit data on Turkey's public transport investment for the period 2003-2014 and in-depth interviews to provide results in support of our hypothesis.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Building Electoral Consensus By Expanding the Territorial DImentioning

confidence: 99%

Building consensus: shifting strategies in the territorial targeting of Turkey's public transport investment

Luca

Rodríguez‐Pose

2019

Regional Studies

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“…HDP was the first pro-Kurdish political party to overcome the 10 percent national electoral threshold on 7 June 2015. It is one of the most influential political parties of Turkey (Kaya and Whiting, 2019) and, as of 2019, the third biggest political party in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, holding 67 of the 600 seats.…”

Section: The Turkish-kurdish Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dehumanization on Twitter in the Turkish–Kurdish conflict

Tutkal¹

2020

Media, War & Conflict

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This article examines the dissemination of images of mutilated and humiliated dead bodies of ‘others’ and reactions of Twitter users to these images as dehumanizing practices. When the peace negotiations between the Turkish state and Kurdish PKK failed, numerous images of mutilated and humiliated dead bodies of PKK militants were disseminated by Twitter accounts apparently used by members of the Turkish security forces. The author focuses on two controversial cases from 2015 and immediate social media reactions to those images in order to demonstrate how dehumanization of Kurdish militants played out in the case of Turkey.

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“…The peace process between 2013 and 2015 was the first official “peace” attempt in the history of modern Turkey, and eventually failed. Within the growing literature on the Turkish state’s failed peace process with the PKK, one can find analyses of the aims and motivations behind the AKP’s “democratization attempts” (Günay and Yörük 2019; Jongerden 2019; Kaya and Whiting 2019), as well as discussions of the causes of disagreement in the fall out between the AKP and the PKK (Baser and Ozerdem 2021; Tekdemir 2016; Toktamış 2019). Although limited, some studies discuss the impact of the Rojava experience 2 in Northern Syria on Turkey’s peace process with the PKK (Çiçek 2018; Özpek 2017; Savran 2020; Weiss 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

From resolution to resecuritization: populist communication of the AKP’s Kurdish peace process in Turkey

Dinc

Özdüzen

2023

New Perspect. Turk.

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This article contributes to the existing literature on the populist online communication of governments. We look at the role of the micro-blogging social media platform Twitter under the authoritarian rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the wider Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP) during the peace process. We carried out a rhetorical analysis of the Twitter posts of four key AKP actors – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Yalçın Akdoğan, and Efkan Ala – between July 1, 2012 and November 1, 2015. First, we show that the AKP actors persistently label the Kurdish political movement in Turkey and in Syria as a threat to the national security of Turkey, reflected in their rhetoric toward the remilitarization and resecuritization of Turkey’s Kurdish question within and across its borders. Second, we argue that the AKP used the peace process and various persuasive communicative techniques not only to consolidate Kurdish electoral support, but also to reach its aim to remove the Kemalist military–bureaucratic tutelage in Turkey that was replaced with hyper-presidentialism under the strong personality cult of Erdoğan. Third, we argue that Erdoğan’s increased one-man power has been reflected in the AKP’s branding itself as the only viable choice for the Kurdish region’s stability, which has blocked more constructive dialogue toward a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question.

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The HDP, the AKP and the Battle for Turkish Democracy

Cited by 31 publications

References 24 publications

Building consensus: shifting strategies in the territorial targeting of Turkey's public transport investment

Building consensus: shifting strategies in the territorial targeting of Turkey's public transport investment

Dehumanization on Twitter in the Turkish–Kurdish conflict

From resolution to resecuritization: populist communication of the AKP’s Kurdish peace process in Turkey

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