2016
DOI: 10.1057/s41304-016-0083-6
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militaries’ roles in political regimes: introducing the PRM data set

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Cited by 11 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…26 The military can find numerous ways, overt and covert, to influence and contest political decision-making to the extent that it can significantly constrain the options of democratically elected politicians. 27 Even in the United States, the country that is widely seen as having achieved Samuel Huntington's ideal of objective civilian control with a clear division between a subordinate, 'professional' military, on the one hand, and the civilian sphere, on the other, 28 heads of military service branches have frequently exercised veto powers and compelled governments to compromise with the armed forces. 29 An important reason for this, in Peter D. Feaver's view, is that the military as agent often has different preferences than their civilian principals.…”
Section: Civil-military Relations and Military Missionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…26 The military can find numerous ways, overt and covert, to influence and contest political decision-making to the extent that it can significantly constrain the options of democratically elected politicians. 27 Even in the United States, the country that is widely seen as having achieved Samuel Huntington's ideal of objective civilian control with a clear division between a subordinate, 'professional' military, on the one hand, and the civilian sphere, on the other, 28 heads of military service branches have frequently exercised veto powers and compelled governments to compromise with the armed forces. 29 An important reason for this, in Peter D. Feaver's view, is that the military as agent often has different preferences than their civilian principals.…”
Section: Civil-military Relations and Military Missionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Today, only few works systematically account for military role expansion in both emerging democracies and authoritarian regimes. Against the backdrop of declining numbers of military coups, “indices do not show a constant decline in military influence,” resulting in the “still highly relevant role of militaries” across the globe (Croissant, Eschenauer, and Kamerling 2017, 411).…”
Section: Perceptions Of the Militarymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Table 1 offers some basic statistics that illustrate how the role and scope of the military differs in military dictatorships compared to other forms of dictatorship or democracies. Using data from the Political Roles of the Military (PRM) data set (Croissant et al, 2016) capturing various characteristics of the military in a sample of 120 developing countries from 1999 to 2012, it shows how regimes vary across three variables: military veto (which measures whether the military is a veto player and/or capable of restricting the government's powers); military repression (which measures whether the military is deployed internally to deter political dissent); and military impunity (which measures whether members of the armed forces engage in illegal activities with little risk of prosecution or conviction). The data illustrate that in military dictatorships, the military is nearly always: (a) a veto player; (b) a force used for domestic repression; and (c) a participant in criminal acts that go unpunished.…”
Section: Policing Under Military Dictatorshipmentioning
confidence: 99%