Mental Causes and Explanation of Action

Macdonald, Cynthia; Macdonald, Graham

doi:10.2307/2219765

Cited by 74 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…They can be events as conceived by Davidson (1967) or property-instantiations as conceived by Kim (1968) or differently conceived by Macdonald and Macdonald (1986). They can be facta in Mellor's (1995) sense.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some believe that the problem can only be solved by returning to reductive physicalism (e.g. Papineau 1990, Kim 1998 others that it should be solved by some kind of dualism (Lowe 2008); or that it needs a different account of the relata of causation (Robb 1997, Ehring 1999, Macdonald & Macdonald 1986; see also Gibb 2004); or that it needs a different account of causation (Menzies 2008, Raatikainen forthcoming). This is the form the debate has taken in the last decade or two.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

There is No Exclusion Problem

Árnadóttir¹,

Crane²

2013

Mental Causation and Ontology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

There is No Exclusion Problem

Árnadóttir¹,

Crane²

2013

Mental Causation and Ontology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…And a number of authors have suggested that we solve the problem by focusing either on the relata of causation (e.g. Robb 1997;Ehring 1999;Macdonald and Macdonald 1986;Gibb 2004) or on the causal relation (e.g. Loewer 2007;Menzies 2008;Raatikainen 2010).…”

Section: Rejecting the Principle Of Additional Causal Powersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Overdetermination and Elimination

Árnadóttir

2015

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I focus on two arguments, due to Jaegwon Kim and Trenton Merricks, that move from claims about the sufficiency of one class of causes to the reduction or elimi- nation of another class of entity, via claims about overdetermination. I argue that in order to validate their move from sufficiency to reduction or elimination, both Kim and Merricks must assume that there can be no ‘weak overdetermination’; i.e., that no single effect can have numerically distinct but dependently sufficient causes occurring at the same time. One problem for both arguments is that weak overdetermination isn’t obviously objectionable. That point has been well made before. But I want here to go further than merely shifting the burden of proof onto the advocates of overdetermination arguments. I want to tease out why they are so convinced that we must resist weak overdetermination and explain why their conviction is misguided. Both Merricks and Kim, I shall argue, ultimately rest their case on the same motivating principle, which I call the principle of additional causal powers. This principle, I argue further, should be rejected. It lacks argumentative support, and it begs the question against those at whom the arguments are directed

show abstract

“…These distinctions are important to our solution to the problem of causal relevance, since only certain ways of developing the PEA will make that solution possible. For more on the distinction between static and dynamic properties, and the differences between Kim's and Lombard's versions of the PEA, see Macdonald (1989Macdonald ( , 2005.…”

Section: Objections From the Oppositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That mental and physical events might have different subjects-mental ones having, say, persons, and physical ones having, say, brains-does not preclude identity between mental and physical events on the PEA, since the distinction between subjects and minimal subjects allows for the possibility that persons are not minimal subjects of mental events. For more on this, see Macdonald (1989). (10) See Lombard (1986), who points out that the view that events may have more than one constitutive property is not inconsistent with the existence and identity conditions of events as stated by the PEA and formulated in the text here: Suppose that an event, e 1 , is x's exemplifying of F at t, and that an event, e 2 , is x's exemplifying of G at t, where F and G are distinct properties.…”

Section: Objections From the Oppositionmentioning

confidence: 99%