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“…Others solve the causal exclusion problem by watering down irreducibility such that they reject irreducibility at the token level in favour of irreducibility only at the type level (Davidson , 3; Robb , 216–221) – since p * cannot have more than the single sufficient physical cause p , m is token identical with p , though mental types/concepts/properties are irreducible to physical types/concepts/properties. Still others solve the causal exclusion problem by weakening the causal exclusion principle such that p * cannot have multiple independent causes, but p * can have multiple dependent causes (Arnadottir and Crane , 255; Kroedel , 367–368) – p * cannot have multiple independent sufficient causes, but p * can have a sufficient physical cause p and the dependent mental cause m . To this list can be added the trend to escape the causal exclusion problem by weakening physical causal completeness in the manners outlined above – since p * can have no more than a single sufficient cause, and p * has a distinct mental cause m , p is either not a cause of p *, or p is not a sufficient cause of p *, or p is not absolutely or individually sufficient for p *.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The absolute sufficiency of p for p * poses problems for certain nonreductive physicalist solutions to the causal exclusion problem. These nonreductive physicalists argue that p metaphysically necessitates the cause m , and m is necessarily determined by some p , so p and m together cause p * (Loewer , 658; Bennett , 479; Kallestrup , 472; Walter , 678–679; Carey , 257; Shapiro , 522; Arnadottir and Crane , 255; White , 1785–1786). Following Terence Horgan (Horgan , 166), call this the compatibilist view.…”
Section: Absolute Sufficiencymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Johnson's shot is individually sufficient for Murphy's death, since it is possible for Johnson's shot to occur without Smith's shot, so it is possible to discern that Johnson's shot is individually sufficient. But, they argue that individual sufficiency is not appropriate in the case of mental causation, since m and some p are not two independently occurring overdetermining causes, so they cannot occur individually (Arnadottir and Crane , 254). In other words, the counterfactual ( p & ~ m ) □→ p * is vacuous (Bennett , 490; 2008, 291), which shows that p without m is impossible, so the requirement that p cause p * without m cannot get off the ground.…”
Section: Individual Sufficiencymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Circumstance sufficiency also gains credence from those considerations seeking to weaken absolute sufficiency: the absolutely sufficient cause is too enormously complex, so it is of profit to be satisfied with circumstance sufficiency (cf. Crane , 234; Arnadottir and Crane , 258–263; Stoljar and List , 97).…”
Nonreductive physicalists endorse the principle of mental causation, according to which some events have mental causes. Nonreductive physicalists also endorse the principle of physical causal completeness, according to which physical events have sufficient physical causes. Critics typically level the causal exclusion problem against this nonreductive physicalist model, according to which the physical cause is a sufficient cause of the behavioural effect, so the mental cause is excluded from causally influencing the behaviour. Numerous nonreductive physicalists have responded to the causal exclusion problem by weakening the principle of physical causal completeness in various ways. The result: either various nonreductive physicalist solutions fail on account of the fact that they do not satisfy a robustly defined principle of physical causal completeness, or there is an accelerating trend of solving the causal exclusion problem by suitably weakening the principle of physical causal completeness.
“…Others solve the causal exclusion problem by watering down irreducibility such that they reject irreducibility at the token level in favour of irreducibility only at the type level (Davidson , 3; Robb , 216–221) – since p * cannot have more than the single sufficient physical cause p , m is token identical with p , though mental types/concepts/properties are irreducible to physical types/concepts/properties. Still others solve the causal exclusion problem by weakening the causal exclusion principle such that p * cannot have multiple independent causes, but p * can have multiple dependent causes (Arnadottir and Crane , 255; Kroedel , 367–368) – p * cannot have multiple independent sufficient causes, but p * can have a sufficient physical cause p and the dependent mental cause m . To this list can be added the trend to escape the causal exclusion problem by weakening physical causal completeness in the manners outlined above – since p * can have no more than a single sufficient cause, and p * has a distinct mental cause m , p is either not a cause of p *, or p is not a sufficient cause of p *, or p is not absolutely or individually sufficient for p *.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The absolute sufficiency of p for p * poses problems for certain nonreductive physicalist solutions to the causal exclusion problem. These nonreductive physicalists argue that p metaphysically necessitates the cause m , and m is necessarily determined by some p , so p and m together cause p * (Loewer , 658; Bennett , 479; Kallestrup , 472; Walter , 678–679; Carey , 257; Shapiro , 522; Arnadottir and Crane , 255; White , 1785–1786). Following Terence Horgan (Horgan , 166), call this the compatibilist view.…”
Section: Absolute Sufficiencymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Johnson's shot is individually sufficient for Murphy's death, since it is possible for Johnson's shot to occur without Smith's shot, so it is possible to discern that Johnson's shot is individually sufficient. But, they argue that individual sufficiency is not appropriate in the case of mental causation, since m and some p are not two independently occurring overdetermining causes, so they cannot occur individually (Arnadottir and Crane , 254). In other words, the counterfactual ( p & ~ m ) □→ p * is vacuous (Bennett , 490; 2008, 291), which shows that p without m is impossible, so the requirement that p cause p * without m cannot get off the ground.…”
Section: Individual Sufficiencymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Circumstance sufficiency also gains credence from those considerations seeking to weaken absolute sufficiency: the absolutely sufficient cause is too enormously complex, so it is of profit to be satisfied with circumstance sufficiency (cf. Crane , 234; Arnadottir and Crane , 258–263; Stoljar and List , 97).…”
Nonreductive physicalists endorse the principle of mental causation, according to which some events have mental causes. Nonreductive physicalists also endorse the principle of physical causal completeness, according to which physical events have sufficient physical causes. Critics typically level the causal exclusion problem against this nonreductive physicalist model, according to which the physical cause is a sufficient cause of the behavioural effect, so the mental cause is excluded from causally influencing the behaviour. Numerous nonreductive physicalists have responded to the causal exclusion problem by weakening the principle of physical causal completeness in various ways. The result: either various nonreductive physicalist solutions fail on account of the fact that they do not satisfy a robustly defined principle of physical causal completeness, or there is an accelerating trend of solving the causal exclusion problem by suitably weakening the principle of physical causal completeness.
“…Consider for example the following quotes. “Say that a fact is fundamental (or brute) iff it does not obtain in virtue of other facts” (Rosen , 126).“The fundamental (or brute) truths (if such there be) give us the ultimate foundation for the whole of reality” (Cameron , 115).“Fundamental or ‘brute’ facts must be facts within physics” (Árnadóttir and Crane , 252).“There are those facts that are apt for having a ground but lack one. These are the so‐called ‘fundamental’ or ‘brute' facts” (Dasgupta , 387).…”
In metaphysics, the fundamental is standardly equated with that which has no explanation – with that which is, in other words, ‘brute’. But this doctrine of brutalism is in tension with physicists’ ambitions to not only describe but also explain why the fundamental is the way that it is. The tension would ease were science taken to be incapable of furnishing the sort of explanations that brutalists are concerned with, given that these are understood to be of a distinctively ‘metaphysical sort’. But to assume this is to assume a sharp demarcation between physics and metaphysics that surely cannot be taken for granted. This paper sets out to examine the standing of brutalism from the perspective of contemporary fundamental physics, together with theories of explanation drawn both from the philosophy of science and metaphysics. Focusing on what fundamental kinds the world instantiates and how physicists go about determining them, I argue that a partial explanation, in Hempel's sense, may be given of this fundamental feature. Moreover, since this partial explanation issues, at least in part, from stipulations as to the essential nature of the kinds involved, I claim that it has as much right to be regarded as a metaphysical explanation as do grounding explanations. As such, my conclusion will be that the doctrine of brutalism can no longer be regardedas tenable: at least modulo certain plausible essentialist assumptions, it is no longer the case that no explanation can be given of the fundamental.
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