Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) as well as repeated interaction in different settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve. We find that applying the exogenous mechanism captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains, whereas repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only in a setting where players can choose their partners.

Which Way to Cooperate

“…Furthermore, coordination upon the rule of seven out of 10 or any other could prove difficult. Indeed, Engelmann and Grimm (2012) explore a repeated voting game that requires truthfulness in voting in order to achieve efficiency. Just as in our game, a partner's truth‐telling can be deduced statistically only over a number of rounds.…”

Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types

“…The work closest to our own, and in which we have based our proposal, is the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein [17,18]. Related to this work, Engelmann and Grimm [8] presents experimental research on linking mechanisms. An algorithm called Quid Pro Quo (QPQ) [33] has been proposed as an application of this kind of mechanisms to distribute task executions fairly among independent players.…”

The role of information in different bargaining protocols

“…The second subject instead played (4,0,2) -indeed a non-monotone strategy which is a best response to the action played by the first subject. 17 Obviously, this strategy combination is not an equilibrium.…”