Measuring dream self-reflectiveness: A comparison of two approaches.

REM Mentation in Narcoleptics and Normals: An Empirical Test of Two Neurocognitive Theories

“…The aspects of reflective consciousness which most frequently have been focused on in dream research are the dreamer's awareness of the internal origin and hallucinated quality of the ongoing experiences, and the ability to intentionally control aspects of the dream scenario (Green & McCreery, 1994;Kahan, 1994;LaBerge, Nagel, Dement, & Zarcone, 1981). Reflective awareness can be described as awareness that is focused on subjective experience, awareness of ongoing thoughts, feelings or actions (e.g., James, 1890; Smedslund, 1988).…”

Lexical Tendencies of High and Low Barrier Personalities in Narratives of Everyday and Dream Memories

“…This view is fairly consistent with dream research showing that higher-order cognitive processes, including reflective awareness, are suspended during dreaming due to neuropsychological differences in REM sleep compared to waking states (Hobson, 1988;Hobson & McCarley, 1977). However, Kahan (1994) showed that narratives of dreams often do not mention reflective awareness and other meta-cognitive processes; therefore, dream self-reports may provide better insight into dreamers' processes. Kahan and LaBerge (2011) also provided evidence that selfreflective functioning does not differ between waking and dream states.…”

REM sleep deprivation: The wrong paradigm leading to wrong conclusions

“…For example, recent efforts to compare the incidence of high-order cognitive skills, such as self-reflection, decision making, and meta-attention, across REM dreaming and waking suggest that although these skills may be more character-istic of waking than dreaming, these metacognitive skills are, nevertheless, frequently associated with the recall of dream experiences (see, especially, Kahan & LaBerge 1996;Kahan et al 1997). If one assumes a priori that dreaming involves, for example, a suspension of self-reflection (e.g., Hobson 1988b; Koukkou & Lehmann 1983), then one is not inclined to actively test this hypothesis by comparing the incidence of such skills across sleep and waking (also see Kahan 1994;Kahan & LaBerge 1994; for discussion of this issue). In fact, many of the "discontinuity" theorists would claim that differences in cognition across waking and sleep are the result of the same physiological/psychological isomorphism that explains the differences in cognition across REM and NREM sleep (see hobson et al).…”

“…To do this experiment, valid and reliable quantitative measures of self-reflective awareness akin to our bizarreness measure, such as the SR scale (Darling et al 1993;Purcell et al 1986; or the DRS scale (Kahan 1994) would need to be applied. We suggest testing the hypothesis that self-reflective awareness will fluctuate with rises and falls in blood flow to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC).…”