Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation

Kugler, Tamar; Neeman, Zvika; Vulkan, Nir

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.003

Cited by 18 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Hypothesis testing using the Wilcoxon signrank test is applied to determine whether the percentage differential between the two sales mechanisms is statistically significant. 16 We find that the percentage differentials are statistically significant in all cases except when they are analyzed according to location in a down market. Table 6 about here…”

Section: The High F-values Indicate That All the Independent Variablementioning

confidence: 68%

“…They also find that frozen fish sold through auction obtain the highest sales price, although auction sales also exhibit larger monthly variation in prices. Kulger, Neeman, and Vulkan (2006) find that a centralized market is more advantageous to "high-value" traders of homogeneous goods. In their study, "high-value traders" are buyers who have a high willingness to pay and sellers who have low reservation prices.…”

Section: Other Considerations In the Choice Of Sales Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…The percentage price differentials are highest in an up market and lowest in a down market. On average, the 16 Further details pertaining to the number of observations and the z-statistics are available upon request.…”

Section: Comparison Of Price Differences Between Auction and Negotiatmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Auction Versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales

Chow

Hafalır

Yavaş³

2011

SSRN Journal

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We offer a theoretical and empirical comparison of auctions and negotiated sales. We first build a simple model to show that auctions generate a higher relative price than negotiated sales when demand for the asset is strong, when the asset is more homogeneous, and when the asset attracts buyers with higher valuations. Using data from property sales in Singapore, we find support for our theoretical predictions that the auction mechanism obtains a higher relative price in an "up market" than in a flat or down market, in the high-end segment of the property market, and for relatively homogeneous properties than heterogeneous properties.

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Section: The High F-values Indicate That All the Independent Variablementioning

confidence: 68%

Section: Other Considerations In the Choice Of Sales Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 90%

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Auction Versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales

Chow

Hafalır

Yavaş³

2011

SSRN Journal

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“…They also find that frozen fish sold through auction obtain the highest sales price, although auction sales also exhibit larger monthly variation in prices. Kulger, Neeman and Vulkan () find that a centralized market is more advantageous to “high‐value” traders of homogeneous goods. In their study, “high‐value traders” are buyers who have a high willingness to pay and sellers who have low reservation prices.…”

Section: Background and Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auction versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales

Chow

Hafalır

Yavaş

2014

Real Estate Economics

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We offer a theoretical and empirical comparison of auctions and negotiated sales. We first build a simple model to show that auctions generate a higher relative price than negotiated sales when demand for the asset is strong, when the asset is more homogeneous and when the asset attracts buyers with higher valuations. Using data from property sales in Singapore, we find support for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we find that auctions do not necessarily generate a higher price premium for foreclosed properties than for nonforeclosed properties.

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“…Due to their different research questions these papers do not allow for institutions with systematic price biases. Kugler et al (2006) investigate the case of centralised versus decentralised trading institutions. All of these papers rely on the assumption of rational traders and do not allow for learning.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox

Alós–Ferrer

Kirchsteiger

Walzl

2009

The Economic Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether efficient platforms, leading to market -clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers are competing, we find that traders learn to select non-market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market-clearing level, provided at least one such platform is introduced by a market designer. This in turn leads market designers to introduce non-market clearing platforms. Hence platform competition induces non-competitive market outcomes. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Code: C72, D4, D83, L1.Keywords: market institutions, evolution of trading platforms, learning, asymmetric rationality. We are grateful to Dan Friedman and seminar participants in Berlin, UL Brussels, University College London, Louvain-la-Neuve and Maastricht for helpful comments. Carlos Alós-Ferrer

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Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation

Cited by 18 publications

References 16 publications

Auction Versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales

Auction Versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales

Auction versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales

On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox

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