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The seller of a real estate property and his broker have two primary goals: to sell the properly for as high a price as possible and as quickly as possible. While these are separate objectives, they are closely related through the listing price of the seller. The listing price affects how long it takes to find a buyer (i.e., Time On the Market = TOM), and TOM influences the price that results from the bargaining between the seller and the buyer. This leaves the seller and his agent with an important question: What is the optimal price to be asked for the property? The objective of this research is to provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of listing price on TOM and the transaction price. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.

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This paper examines the impact of brokers on buyers' and sellers' search behavior and on the transaction prices in real estate markets. It is shown that the seller and the buyer search less intensively if the house is listed with a broker. The seller gets a higher price when he employs a broker, but the increase in price is smaller than the commission fee. More specifically, the portion of the commission covered by the increase in price is directly related to the bargaining powers of the buyer and the seller. In the special case where the price is determined according to the Nash bargaining solution, the increase in price is shown to be half of the commission fee. It is also shown that an increase in the commission rate increases the equilibrium price but decreases the equilibrium search intensities. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.

We investigate lenders' choice of loans to securitize and whether the loans they sell into the secondary mortgage market are riskier than the loans they retain in their portfolios. Using a large dataset of mortgage loans originated between 2004 and 2008, we find that banks sold low-default risk loans into the secondary market while keeping higher-default risk loans in their portfolios. This result holds for both subprime and prime loans. We do find strong support for adverse selection with respect to prepayment risk; securitized loans had higher prepayment risk than portfolio loans. It appears that in return for selling loans with lower default risk, lenders retain loans with lower prepayment risk. Small lenders place more emphasis than large lenders on default risk versus prepayment risk of the loans they retain. Securitization strategies of lenders changed during the sample period as they became less willing to retain higher-default loans after the housing market reached its peak. There are also differences in the performance of loans sold to GSEs and loans sold to private issuers. Loans sold to private issuers have lower prepayment rates in each year while relative default rates vary across the years.