“…LeBillon () posed a similar question about the role of natural resources, including drugs, in armed conflict, arguing that competition over lucrative products can stimulate competition over production areas, populations, and trading networks, changing both the motives and aims of belligerents. For example, according to Steinberg (, 266), Colombian insurgents no longer employ violence to initiate political change; rather, they “engage the state on the battlefield in an effort to protect the enormous sums of money generated by their participation in the drug trade.” In the highlands of Guatemala, Steinberg and Taylor () wrote that rural violence and criminal activity surged to new heights because of drug‐trafficking conflict and crime. Regardless of place, Chouvy (, 122) argued, as did LeBillon, that vertical local‐global links meant “… the money generated from drug production and trafficking… has always been divided iniquitously, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, among farmers (who receive the smallest share), warlords, who condone or encourage production in their territory, and local and regional traffickers (who get the biggest share).”…”